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Resumo Esta tese tem como objetivo fornecer afirmac¸o˜es conclusivas em relac¸a˜o a`
utilizac¸a˜o eficiente de recursos para redes e aplicac¸o˜es de 5G (5a gerac¸a˜o)
com recurso a teoria dos jogos. Neste contexto, investigamos dois cena´rios
principais, um relativo a comunicac¸o˜es mo´veis e um outro relativo a re-
des inteligentes. Uma me´trica importante para o desenho das redes mo´veis
emergentes e´ a eficieˆncia energe´tica, com particular eˆnfase no lado do dis-
positivo mo´vel, onde as tecnologias das baterias sa˜o ainda limitadas. Alguns
trabalhos de investigac¸a˜o relacionados teˆm demonstrado que a cooperac¸a˜o
pode ser um paradigma u´til no sentido de resolver o problema do de´fice
energe´tico. Contudo, pretendemos ir mais ale´m, ao definir a cooperac¸a˜o e
os utilizadores mo´veis como um grupo de jogadores racionais, que podem
atuar sobre estrate´gias e utilidades, por forma a escolher a retransmissa˜o
mais apropriada para poupanc¸a de energia. Esta interpretac¸a˜o presta-se a`
aplicac¸a˜o da teoria dos jogos, e recorremos assim aos jogos coalicionais para
solucionar conflitos de interesse entre dispositivos cooperantes, empregando
Programac¸a˜o Linear (LP) para resolver o problema da selecc¸a˜o da retrans-
missa˜o e derivar a principal soluc¸a˜o do jogo. Os resultados mostram que a
escolha do jogo de retransmissa˜o coalicional proposto pode potencialmente
duplicar a durac¸a˜o da bateria, numa era em que a pro´xima gerac¸a˜o de dis-
positivos mo´veis necessitara´ de cada vez mais energia para suportar servic¸os
e aplicac¸o˜es cada vez mais sofisticados. O segundo cena´rio investiga a re-
sposta da procura em aplicac¸o˜es smart grid, que esta´ a ganhar interesse sob
a e´gide do 5G e que e´ considerada uma abordagem promissora, incentivando
os utilizadores a consumir electricidade de forma mais uniforme em horas de
vazio. Recorremos novamente a` teoria dos jogos, imaginando as interacc¸o˜es
estrate´gicas entre a empresa fornecedora de energia ele´ctrica e os potenci-
ais utilizadores finais como um jogo de forma extensiva. Sa˜o abordados
dois programas em tempo real de resposta a` procura: Day-Ahead Pricing
(DAP) e Convex Pricing Tariffs. A resposta dos consumidores residenci-
ais conscientes dos prec¸os destas tarifas, e´ formulada como um problema
de Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) ou Quadratic Programming
(QP), nos quais as soluc¸o˜es potenciais sa˜o o agendamento dos seus elec-
trodome´sticos inteligentes de modo a minimizar os seus gastos dia´rios de
electricidade, satisfazendo as suas necessidades dia´rias de energia e n´ıveis
de conforto. Os resultados demonstram que implementar o programa DAP
pode reduzir a raza˜o Peak-to-Average (PAR) ate´ 71% e as faturas de con-
sumo das casas inteligentes ate´ 32%. Para ale´m disso, a aplicac¸a˜o de tarifas
convexas em tempo real pode melhorar ainda mais estas me´tricas de de-
sempenho, alcanc¸ando uma reduc¸a˜o de 80% do PAR e uma economia de
mais de 50% na faturac¸a˜o da energia residencial.

Keywords 5G, Game Theory, Cooperation, Relay Selection, Battery Saving, Smart
Grid, Demand Response, Smart Home Appliance Scheduling.
Abstract This research thesis aims to provide conclusive statements towards effective
resource utilization for 5G (5th Generation) mobile networks and applica-
tions using game theory. In this context, we investigate two key scenarios
pertaining to mobile communications and smart grids. A pivotal design
driver for the upcoming era of mobile communications is energy efficiency,
with particular emphasis on the mobile side where battery technology is still
limited. Related works have shown that cooperation can be a useful engi-
neering paradigm to take a step towards solving the energy deficit. However,
we go beyond by envisaging cooperation and mobile users as a game of ra-
tional players, that can act on strategies and utilities in order to choose the
most appropriate relay for energy saving. This interpretation lends itself to
the application of game theory, and we look at coalitional games to settle
conflicts of interest among cooperating user equipments, and employ Linear
Programming (LP) to solve the relay selection problem and to derive the
core solution of the game. The results reveal that adopting the proposed
coalitional relaying game can potentially double battery lifetime, in an era
where the next wave of next generation handsets will be more energy de-
manding supporting sophisticated services and applications. The second
scenario investigates demand response in smart grid applications, which is
also gaining momentum under the umbrella of 5G, which is a promising
approach urging end-users to consume electricity more evenly during non-
peak hours of the day. Again, we resort to game theory and picture the
strategic interactions between the electric utility company and the poten-
tial end-users as an extensive form game. Two real-time demand response
programmes are addressed, namely Day-Ahead Pricing (DAP) and convex
pricing tariffs. The response of price-aware residential consumers to these
programmes is formulated as Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)
or Quadratic Programming (QP) problem, which optimally schedule their
smart home appliances so as to minimise their daily electricity expenses
while satisfying their daily energy needs and comfort levels. The results
demonstrate that implementing the DAP programme can reduce the Peak-
to-Average Ratio (PAR) of demand by up to 71% and cut smart households
bill by 32%. Moreover, applying real-time convex pricing tariffs can push
these performance metrics even further, achieving 80% PAR reduction and
more than 50% saving on the household electricity bill.

Contents
Contents i
List of Abbreviations iii
List of Figures vii
List of Tables ix
List of Algorithms xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Path Towards 5G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Mobile Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.2 Machine-to-Machine Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.3 5G Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Game Theory for 5G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Thesis Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.5 Thesis Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Game Theory for 5G Applications 17
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Strategic Form Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Market Competition Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1 Pareto Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.2 Cournot Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.3 Bertrand Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Extensive Form Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Coalitional Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5.1 Core Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.2 Shapley Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.3 Stable Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5.4 Bargaining Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5.5 Kernel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5.6 Nucleolus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6 Mathematical Optimisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.6.1 Linear Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
i
2.6.2 Convex Optimisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.7 Game Theory for Wireless Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.8 Cooperative Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.9 Cooperation Enforcement Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 Coalitional Games for Cooperation in 5G Mobile Networks 45
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Coalitional Relay Selection Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.1 Characteristic Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4.2 Relay Selection Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4.3 Core Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.4 Updating Energy Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 Relay Selection Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.6 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6.1 MATLAB Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6.2 NS-2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4 Extensive Form Games for Demand Response in Smart Grids 85
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.4 Demand Response Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5 Pricing Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.6 Smart Home Appliance Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.6.1 Mixed-Integer Linear Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.6.2 Quadratic Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.7 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5 Summary and Future Work 107
5.1 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
References 115
ii
List of Abbreviations
3D Three Dimensional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
5G Fifth-Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
AC Air Conditioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
AF Amplify-and-Forward. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
A-GSM Ad hoc GSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
AllC Always Cooperate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
AllD Always Defect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
AMC Adaptive Modulation and Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
AP Access Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A-TFT Anti Tit-For-Tat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
AWGN Additive White Gaussian Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
BS Base Station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
CapEx Capital Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
CBR Constant Bit Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
CF Compress-and-Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
CHP Combined Heat and Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
CONET Cooperative Networking Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
CSG Coalition Structure Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
CSR Cooperative Short-Range Relaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
CPP Critical-Peak Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
D2D Device-to-Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
DAP Day-Ahead Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
DDPA Distributed Dynamic Pricing Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
DER Distributed Energy Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
DF Decode-and-Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
iii
DG Distributed Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
DOF Degree-of-Freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
DR Demand Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
DSM Demand-Side Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
EE Energy Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
EMS Energy Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
ESG Energy Saving Gain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
EU European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
EV Electric Vehicle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94
FCC Federal Communications Commission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62
FIR Finite Impulse Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91
LAN Local Area Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
GSM Global System for Mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
GT Grim Trigger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
G-TFT Generous Tit-For-Tat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
HANET Hybrid Ad-hoc Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
HEMS Home Energy Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
HSPA High Speed Packet Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
IBT Inclining Block Tariff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
IDPS Intrusion Detection and Prevention System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
IoT Internet of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
IPM Interior-Point Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
LOS Line-Of-Sight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68
LP Linear Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
LTE Long Term Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
LTE-A Long Term Evolution-Advanced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
M2M Machine-to-Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
MAC Medium Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
MANET Mobile Ad-hoc Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
MCN Multihop Cellular Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
MILP Mixed Integer Linear Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
MIMO Multiple-Input Multiple-Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
mm-wave millimetre-wave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
MRC Maximal Ratio Combining. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
MTC Machine Type Communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
iv
NE Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
NLOS Non-Line-Of-Sight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
NTU Non-Transferable Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
ODMA Opportunity Driven Multiple Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
OpEx Operational expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
PAN Personal Area Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
PAR Peak-to-Average Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
PDA Proximal Decomposition Algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90
PFD Packet Forwarding Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
PDA Personal Digital Assistant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
PHEV Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
PHY Physical Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
PSW Particle Swarm Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
PV Photovoltaic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93
QoS Quality of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
QP Quadratic Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
RAN Radio Access Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
RoF Radio over Fibre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
RS Relay Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
RTP Real-Time Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
RWP Random Way Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
SC Selective Combining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
SDN Software-Defined Networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SE Spectral Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
S-TFT Suspicious Tit-For-Tat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
TDD Time Division Duplex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
TFT Tit-For-Tat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
ToU Time-of-Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
TU Transferable Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
UE User Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
UHD Ultra-High Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
UWB Ultra Wide Band . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
v
V2G Vehicle-to-Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
V2I Vehicle-to-Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
V2V Vehicle-to-Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
V2X Vehicle-to-X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
VCG Vickrey-Clarke-Groves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
VI Variational Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
VoIP Voice-over-IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
WWRF Wireless World Research Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
vi
List of Figures
1.1 Foreseen architecture for 5G cellular systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 The ‘Packet Forwarding Dilemma’ Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 Contrasting multihop communication (a) and cooperative relaying (b) . . . . 39
2.4 Fading of the direct and relay channels of cooperative relaying wireless channel 41
2.5 Multihop Cellular Network (MCN) with fixed Relay Stations (RS) . . . . . . 42
2.6 MCN with mobile RSs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1 The growing ‘energy gap’ between battery capacity and energy consumption
of User Equipments (UE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Coalitional short-range relaying, shaded links depict short-range, while the
plain ones depict cellular links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 Coalition Structure Generation (CSG): partitioning UEs into coalitions . . . 52
3.4 Number of possible coalition structures for different coalition sizes with its
upper and lower bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Graph model of coalitional relay selection game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6 Relay selection problem as a binary decision making problem . . . . . . . . . 58
3.7 Structure of matrix A introduced in Eq. (3.11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.8 An example of relay selection problem with three relays and four sources . . . 61
3.9 WiFi and WiMedia data rates for different distances between the transmitter
and receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.10 Energy Saving Gain (ESG) for different coalition sizes and relay densities . . 71
3.11 Standard deviation of ESG for different coalition sizes and relay densities . . 71
3.12 Impact of cooperative communications on battery life extension of UEs . . . 73
3.13 ESG for different values of utility function’s weighting factor, α . . . . . . . . 73
3.14 Comparing battery lives of cooperative and selfish UEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.15 Comparing credit levels of cooperative and selfish UEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.16 ESG of a coalition for 5, 10 and 15 relay nodes when the number of source
nodes varies from 1 to 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.17 ESG of a coalition for 5, 10 and 15 source nodes when the number of relay
nodes varies from 1 to 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.18 ESG for different values of the ‘maximum speed’ of Random Way Point (RWP)
mobility model for the UEs (α = 0.5, pause time= 5s, R=25, S=25) . . . . . 77
3.19 ESG for different values of the ‘pause time’ of RWP mobility model for the
UEs (α = 0.5, maximum speed= 3 m/s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
vii
3.20 Net ESG for different coalition sizes (cell size=20 m×20 m, traffic rate=20
packet/s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.21 Net ESG for different coalition sizes (cell size=60 m×60 m, traffic rate=60
packet/s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.22 Net ESG for different coalition sizes (traffic type 1 with rate 20 packet/s) . . 81
3.23 Net ESG for different coalition sizes (Traffic type 2 with rate 20 packet/s) . . 81
3.24 Net ESG of relay selection algorithm for 1 to 4 class A relay nodes when the
coalition size varies from 5 to 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.1 Smart power grid: the solid and dashed lines represent power and information
flows, respectively . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Electricity supply chain, shaded blocks depict the demand side . . . . . . . . 88
4.3 Considered DR scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.4 Scheduler embedded in user’s Smart Meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.5 Linear and quadratic price functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.6 Non-shiftable and shiftable loads before scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.7 Non-shiftable and shiftable loads after Mixed Integer Linear Programming
(MILP) scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.8 Non-shiftable and shiftable loads after Quadratic Programming (QP) scheduling104
4.9 Daily bills of users before and after MILP scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.10 Daily bills of users before and after QP scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
viii
List of Tables
1.1 Data consumptions of mobile devices [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3.1 Data rate and energy cost of IEEE 802.11g for different distances between the
transmitter and the receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 Valuations of relays and sources for one bit relaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3 Coalition’s energy saving and the ‘core’ solution (in units of nJ) . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 System parameters for WiFi and WiMedia interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5 Assumed channel propagation models for WiFi and WiMedia . . . . . . . . . 69
3.6 Receiver sensitivities for WiFi and WiMedia systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7 Power consumptions of short-range and cellular interfaces in different states . 79
3.8 Average ESG for different number of Class A relays, each experiment is aver-
aged over 10 replicas with random seeds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.1 Day-Ahead Pricing (DAP) tariff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.2 Non-shiftable Appliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3 Shiftable Appliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
ix
x
List of Algorithms
3.1 Relay selection algorithm performed by a UE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2 Relay selection algorithm performed by the RAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 Algorithm for solving the relay selection problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.4 Algorithm to obtain the core solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5 Energy credit updating algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
xi
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Path Towards 5G
We are witnessing an exponential growth in the amount of traffic carried through mobile
networks. According to Cisco visual networking index [1], mobile data traffic has doubled
during 2010-2011; extrapolating this growth rate for the rest of the decade shows that global
mobile traffic will increase by a factor of 1000 by 2020. The surge in mobile traffic is primar-
ily driven by the proliferation of mobile devices and the accelerated adoption of data-hungry
mobile smart phones. Table 1.1 provides a list of these device along with their relative data
consumptions, where feature phone refers to a low-end mobile device that typically supports
voice and text services and access to the Internet but lacks the advanced functionality of
a smart phone. In addition to the increasing demand for high-end mobile devices, another
important factor associated with this tremendous traffic growth is the drive towards advanced
multimedia applications such as Ultra-High Definition (UHD) and 3D video, as well as aug-
mented reality and immersive experience. Today, mobile video accounts for more than 50%
of global mobile data traffic, which is anticipated to rise to two-thirds by 2018 [1].
1.1.1 Mobile Traffic
In fact, the growth rate of mobile data traffic is much higher than its voice counterpart.
Global mobile voice traffic was overtaken by the global mobile data traffic in 2009, and it is
forecast that Voice-over-IP (VoIP) traffic will represent only 0.4% of the mobile data traffic
by 2015. In 2013, the number of mobile subscriptions reached 6.8 billion, corresponding to a
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Table 1.1: Data consumptions of mobile devices [1]
Device Relative data usage
Feature phone 1×
Smart phone 24×
Handheld gaming console 60×
Tablet 122×
Laptop 512×
global penetration of 96%. This ever-growing global subscriber rate, spurred on by the world
population growth, will place stringent new demands on Fifth-Generation (5G) networks to
cater for one billion additional new customers.
1.1.2 Machine-to-Machine Communication
Apart from 1000× mobile traffic growth, the increasing number of connected devices
imposes another challenge on the future mobile network. It is envisaged that in the future
connected society, everyone and everything will be inter-connected – under the umbrella of
Internet of Things (IoT) – where tens to hundreds of devices will serve every person. This
upcoming 5G cellular infrastructure and its support for ‘Big Data’ will enable cities to be
smart. Data will be generated everywhere by not only people but also machines, and will be
analysed in a real-time fashion to infer useful information, from people’s habits and preferences
to traffic monitoring on the streets and health monitoring for patients and elderly people.
Mobile communications will play a pivotal role in enabling efficient and safe transportation
by allowing vehicles to communicate with each other or with a roadside infrastructure to
warn or even help the drivers in case of unseen hazards, paving the way towards autonomous
self-driving cars. This type of Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications may require very
stringent latency (less than 1 ms) [2], which imposes further challenges on the future mobile
network.
1.1.3 5G Architecture
The 1000× mobile traffic growth along with billions or even trillions of foreseen con-
nected devices is pushing the cellular system to an ultrabroadband ubiquitous network with
massive capacity and Energy Efficiency (EE) and diverse Quality of Service (QoS) support
[3]. Indeed, it is envisaged that the next-generation cellular system will be the first in-
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Figure 1.1: Foreseen architecture for 5G cellular systems
stance of a truly converged wired and wireless network [4], providing ‘fibre-like’ experience
for mobile users, leveraging technologies such as Radio over Fibre (RoF). This ubiquitous,
ultra-broadband, and ultra-low latency wireless infrastructure will connect the society and
drive the future economy. Figure 1.1 depicts our foreseen architecture for 5G cellular systems,
harnessing all the common views on the current technology trends and the emerging appli-
cations. As illustrated in this figure, 5G will be a truly converged system supporting a wide
range of applications from mobile voice and multi-Giga-bit-per-second mobile Internet to
Device-to-Device (D2D) [5] and Vehicle-to-X (V2X) [6] (X stands for either Vehicle, Vehicle-
to-Vehicle (V2V), or Infrastructure, Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I)) communications, as well
as native support for Machine Type Communications (MTC) and public safety applications.
Three Dimensional (3D)-Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) will be incorporated at
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Base Station (BS)s to further enhance the data rate and the capacity at the macro-cell level.
System performance in terms of coverage, capacity and EE will be further enhanced in dead
and hot spots using relay stations, cooperative communications, hyperdense small-cell de-
ployments and WiFi oﬄoading [3, 7]; directional millimetre-wave (mm-wave) links will be
exploited for backhauling the relay and/or small-cell BSs [8]. D2D communications can be
assisted by the macro-BS, providing the control plane. In particular, we further detail these
technologies and applications that will form part of the 5G paradigm, and figure predomi-
nantly in the research scenarios:
Cloud RAN
Cloud networking [9–11] could potentially be applied to the Radio Access Network (RAN),
and beyond that, to mobile User Equipment (UE)s that might form local coalitions and
pool their scarce resources that could be managed either by a delegated local coordinator
(selected among the UEs) or by the network operator. Cloud RAN could help not only
manage the RAN resources more efficiently by sharing them among multiple operators, but
also bring the applications through the cloud closer to the end-user, which might help reduce
the communication latency to support delay-sensitive real-time emerging control applications,
such as autonomous self-driving cars [12].
Millimetre-Wave Technology
It is envisaged that 5G will seamlessly integrate the existing RANs (e.g., Global System for
Mobile (GSM), High Speed Packet Access (HSPA), Long Term Evolution (LTE) and WiFi)
with the complementary new ones invented for mm-wave bands (i.e., frequencies of above
30 GHz) [11, 13, 14]. It is foreseen that mm-wave technology may revolutionise the mobile
industry not only because of plenty of available spectrum at this band (readily allowing Gbps
wireless pipes without need for sophisticated modulation or multiplexing scheme), but also
because of diminishing antenna sizes, enabling the fabrication of array antennas with hundreds
or thousands of antenna elements, even at the UE [8]. Smart antennas with beamforming
and phased array capabilities will be employed to point out the antenna beam to a desired
location with high precision, rotated electronically through phase shifting. The narrow pencil
beams will enable the exploiting of the spatial Degree-of-Freedom (DOF), without interfering
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with other users. The diminishing of antenna sizes will enable Massive/3D MIMO at BSs
and eventually at the UEs [15]. The mm-wave technology could also provide ultra-broadband
backhaul links to carry the traffic from/to either the small BSs or the relay stations, allowing
further deployment flexibility for the operators, compared to the wired (copper or fibre)
backhaul link.
Small Cell Technology
Hyperdense small-cell deployment is another promising solution for 5G to meet the 1000×
capacity challenge [16, 17]. Small cells have the potential to provide massive capacity and
to minimise the physical distance between the BS and the UEs to achieve the required EE
enhancement for 5G [18]. The traditional sub-3 GHz bands will be employed for macro-cell
blanket coverage, while the higher frequency bands (e.g., cm- and mm-wave bands) will be
employed for small cells to provide a spectral- and energy-efficient data plane, assisted by a
control plane served by the macro-BS [19, 20]. However, this massive deployment of small
cells could potentially increase the inter-cell interference level. Furthermore, the control
signalling burden hampers managing these massively deployed small cells in a centralised
fashion. Therefore, small cells should be smart enough to self-organise themselves and allow
the network to partly or wholly delegate the resource management to themselves.
Evolution of 4G
Along with the development of new RANs and the deployment of hyperdense small cells,
the existing RANs will continue to evolve to support higher Spectral Efficiency (SE) and EE.
The data plane latency (round-trip time) of the Long Term Evolution-Advanced (LTE-A) [21]
system is around 20 ms, which is expected to diminish to less than 1 ms in its future evolutions
[22]. The SE of the existing HSPA system is 1 b/s/Hz/cell, which is expected to increase 10×
by 2020 [22]. We expect energy consumption of mobile networks to decrease 10×, despite
expected 100× improvement in their data rates [6]. This implies that the EE of the cellular
system needs to be improved 100+× [23]. The Physical Layer (PHY) and Medium Access
Control (MAC) layer techniques will be revisited for carrying short and delay-sensitive packets
for MTC [24] along with incumbent data applications such as multimedia and web browsing.
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) will play a key role in 5G for efficient resource utilisation
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in cellular systems, allowing multi-tenant networks where mobile operators will not need to
own a complete set of dedicated network equipment anymore; rather, network equipment
(i.e., RAN) might be shared among different operators. The existing cloud network concept
mainly involves the data centres. Mobile network virtualisation will push this concept towards
the backhaul and the RAN to allow sharing of backhaul links and the BSs among different
operators. Last but not least, it is envisaged that 5G UEs will be multimode intelligent devices
that, similar to a cognitive radio, can learn about their surrounding radio environment – e.g.,
the channel quality, their own and other nearby UE’s remaining battery energy, the EE of
different RANs, and the QoS requirement of their running application – through listening to
the medium or exchanging context information with their neighbour UEs. These UEs will
be smart enough to autonomously choose the right interface to connect to the network based
on this context information. These smart multimode 5G UEs will accommodate dozens of
antenna elements [8, 25] and help support super fast speeds up to 10 Gbps [6].
Smart Grid
The integration of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) with today’s power
network will transform it to an intelligent network (smart grid), connecting all stakeholder
from generating units and substations to utility companies and consumers, enabling the sys-
tem to operate more efficiently and more reliably [26, 27]. This opens up a wealth of op-
portunities for 5G, aiming to connect everything. M2M communications will help connect
household appliances through the smart metres, smart thermostats or some other gateways
to the utility companies at the electricity distribution network level [28, 29]. Two-way M2M
communications could be established between the household appliances and the utility com-
pany, which will help better utilise the electricity grid infrastructure. The utility company
could be able to set a more dynamic time-dependent or even demand-dependent tariff to
influence the consumers’ consumption habits. It might monitor the demand in real-time and
based on the demand and supply conditions, could alter the short-term price to either en-
courage or discourage users to consume electricity. On the other hand, the smart appliances
can receive the price information in or close to real-time, and based on this available pricing
and users’ preferences, could choose optimal intervals for their operations so as to minimise
the energy cost for the user without compromising her satisfaction level [30].
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1.2 Challenges
Cooperation is foreseen to be pivotal technology in 5G, as a means of promoting energy
saving in handset devices. Cooperation allows the network to become both user and network
centric where mobile devices also become part of the network resources, to be utilised towards
improving the communication experience or effectiveness. However, it is clear that coopera-
tion of these UEs cannot be taken for granted as they are normally owned by rational agents
who seek to maximise their own utility. There might be some altruistic reasons for coopera-
tion in some instances, for instance to save humans in occasions when their life is in danger,
yet it is obvious that UEs would not always cooperate solely for altruistic reasons. Therefore,
incentive mechanisms are needed to stimulate UEs to cooperate and to settle potential con-
flicts of interest arising from their interactions. In this context, we investigate new challenges
with regards to cooperation and explore how game theory can be an effective tool towards
putting in place new incentive mechanisms to promote energy efficient communications.
Under the umbrella of 5G, smart grids are seen as a potential application use-case that will
allow electricity companies to manage better the production and supply of energy. Smart grids
will not only be reliant on mature M2M technology as the enabler to support effective remote
management, but will also require new approaches towards managing power consumption
through incentive mechanisms. In today’s networks, most of the electricity providers offer
tariffs that are quite stable and independent from the wholesale electricity price fluctuations.
Although these price-hedging mechanisms have certain benefits for a risk-averse consumer,
it isolates the demand-side of the electricity market from its supply-side, preventing any
demand response to real-time price variations in the spot market due to supply/demand
imbalances. Therefore, there exists a need for more effective tariff designs that can help
improve the economic efficiency of the electricity market. However, this might be conflicting
with the consumer’s satisfaction. In this regard, designing a game that can improve the market
efficiency without compromising the user’s convenience can be challenging. In this regard,
new challenges will arise in considering new Demand-Side Management (DSM) strategies that
are able to improve the economic efficiency of the electricity market, without affecting the
user’s QoS. In this regard, we investigate how game theory can be used to provide concrete
step towards DSM in 5G smart grids.
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1.3 Game Theory for 5G
Game theory has been proven as an effective technique to help improve resource utilisation
is wireless networks [31–38] and smart grids [36, 39–41]. It is a fascinating mathematical tool
to analyse potential conflicts of interest arising among independent rational agents1 when they
strategically interact with each other. Having classically been used as a toolkit to analyse
economic and political conflicts of interest, it has recently attracted considerable amount of
interest from engineers and researchers to analyse and exploit game theory to solve practical
challenges in wireless communications and applications.
As an important foreseen application for 5G, cooperative communications can help im-
prove the performance of wireless networks considerably. For instance, it could be exploited to
improve the battery life of UEs. However, there is still lack of knowledge about how rational
and smart 5G UEs will interact when they cooperate, how to stimulate them to cooper-
ate and discourage them from acting selfishly. Incentive mechanisms and trust management
techniques (e.g., credit or reputation scheme) are needed to ensure proper cooperation of
the future generations of UEs, which are expected to be intelligent enough to act rationally,
or almost rationally, with good approximation. It is also envisaged that these UEs will be
able to exchange context information so as to assess the effectiveness of their cooperation in
a certain scenario. Whenever the cooperation is energy efficient, they rely on cooperative
communication. Otherwise, if the cooperation is not energy efficient, they execute their com-
munications individually. Our primary objective in addressing this problem is to encourage
UEs to cooperate and to discourage them acting selfishly, which lends itself to a game theory
problem.
Another interesting application of game theory is DSM in the smart grid. In this context,
it can be used to provide a set of solutions that help the utility companies to encourage
consumers to consume electricity more evenly during the day. The daily electricity demand
follows the daily work cycle of the consumers. It falls during the night when people are asleep
and starts to rise in the morning when people get up and start their work. It peaks during
the afternoon or evening hours, depending on the season, due to air conditioning or using
cooking and entertainment appliances once people arrive home. This demand fluctuation
pushes the utilities to deploy additional generation units to meet the peak demand. How-
1A rational agent is by definition the one that always seeks to maximise its own payoff.
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ever, this additional capacity is underused during off-peak periods. This makes the grid run
economically inefficient, which pushes the energy prices upwards. This is due to the fact that
someone has to pay for this inefficiency, and the utilities normally pass all the costs on to
the consumers. To this end, game theoretic techniques can be exploited to model strategic
interaction between utility companies and the users to enhance the demand response. In fact,
contrary to a load following generation, DSM solicits the demand to follow the variations in
the generation side. Improving the economic efficiency, a responsive demand can benefit every
user by reducing the energy prices, while ensuring the utilities about customer’s satisfaction
and balancing the supply and demand.
1.4 Thesis Contribution
We apply game theory along with other microeconomics tools (e.g., incentive mechanisms,
market competition models, price elasticity of demand, etc.) and optimisation techniques to
enhance resource utilisation in the future smart infrastructures such as mobile networks and
electric power system. We particularly address the strategic interactions of rational agents
in those systems and provide two contributions: (i) we apply coalitional games to encourage
cooperation of UEs in a mobile network; and (ii) we exploit extensive-form games to enhance
demand response in a smart electricity grid. In the former, we interpret the available relay
nodes and the battery energy of the cooperative nodes as the available resource and match
the cooperative partners in a way that maximises their total energy efficiently. In contrast, in
the latter, we intrpret the power generation units as well as the power transmission and dis-
tribution systems as the available resource and design demand-side management programmes
that can help enhance the load factor2 of the power system.
To address the first problem, we go beyond the state-of-the-art and incorporate coalitional
game theory to capture the strategic interactions between neibouring 5G UEs that form a
coalition and cooperate to extend their battery lives. We first characterise the problem as a
coalitional game and then derive its ‘core’ solution to settle the potential conflict(s) of interest
arising between the cooperating UEs. In particular, we consider a scenario where a set of
source UEs aim to communicate with a RAN, and there resides another set of nearby (idle)
2Load factor of a system is defined as the ratio between the average load and the peak load over a specified
time period.
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UEs with good channel qualities and good battery levels that are willing to cooperate as relays.
We assume that a source UE can always communicate with the RAN directly (i.e., using its
cellular interface); however, if it is experiencing a poor channel quality or if it is running on
low battery, it can set up a cooperative short-range link with a neighbouring relay to relay its
traffic back to the RAN. This cooperative link is basically a two-hop link where the first hop,
from the source node to the relay, is performed over a short-range link, established exploiting
the UEs’ short-range interfaces (e.g., Bluetooth, WiMedia, etc.), while the second hop, from
the relay to the RAN, is performed conventionally over a cellular link. We characterise the
underlying relay-source matching problem as a binary Linear Programming (LP) problem
that intends to maximise the (common) energy saving of the coalition subject to meeting
the resource constraints of the cooperating UEs. Lastly, we provide a credit scheme based
on coalitional game theory to distinguish and isolate selfish nodes from the cooperative ones.
Our system level simulations in MATLAB and NS2 reveal that adopting this approach, UEs
can save up to 50% in their energy consumption.
To address the second problem, we apply game theory to help enhance demand response
in the electricity market. We apply non-cooperative games where every player pursues a
strategy that maximises her own payoff. The payoff of the utility company is defined as
the Peak-to-Average Ratio (PAR) of the aggregate demand, while the payoff of a residential
customer is defined as his/her satisfaction minus his/her daily electricity cost. This allows
the utility company to adopt a time-dependent tariff so as the retail price can rise when the
aggregate demand is at a peak and fall when the demand goes down (in off-peak hours). This
could encourage the retail customers to consume electricity during different hours as evenly
as possible. We provide the game definition, as well the definition of the utility function and
formulate the optimisation problems for the company and the user under both linear and
quadratic generation cost functions. We validate the effectiveness of this DSM game through
MATLAB simulations considering a single retail provider supplying multiple residential cus-
tomers, each of them possessing a number of shiftable and non-shiftable appliances.
The results have been disseminated in 21 papers that include 8 articles in international
peer-reviewed journals such as IEEE Wireless Communications; 5 book chapters in high-
impact books by publishers such as John Wiley & Sons and Springer; and 8 papers in IEEE
conferences that have been archived in IEEE Xplore Digital Library:
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1.5 Thesis Organisation
This PhD thesis is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents a survey on game theory and its potential applications for 5G sce-
narios, such as cooperative communications and smart grids. In this chapter, we briefly
introduce different game types such as strategic form games and the Nash Equilib-
rium (NE), to predict the strategic outcome of these games. As examples of strategic
form games, we introduce Cournot and Bertrand games which are mainly used to anal-
yse strategic behaviour of firms in an oligopolistic market, such as spectrum trading by
cognitive radios or electricity trading in a competitive market. We also introduce the
concept of Pareto-efficiency as a metric for the social wellbeing. Extensive-form games
are also introduced in this chapter. These games are useful to capture situations when
players move sequentially, one after another, and at each stage of game, players take
actions based on their payoffs and the past moves of their opponents. We introduce
a Stackelberg game, which is an extensive-form game suitable to model a number of
important 5G applications such as DSM and cognitive radio. Finally, we conclude this
chapter with an introduction to coalitional game theory and their solution concepts.
Different from strategic-form games where players aim to maximise their own payoff,
coalitional games could model scenarios where players are interested to optimise not
only their individual payoffs but also their group payoff. These games could be specifi-
cally promising to capture and analyse cooperative communications scenarios for next
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generation cellular systems.
• Chapters 3 and 4 provide the main innovations of this thesis, covering our solutions
and research findings to the two addressed research problems, i.e., cooperative commu-
nications for 5G mobile network applications and DSM in smart grids. In particular,
Chapter 3 discusses the cooperation of 5G UEs to extend their battery life and enjoy
network connectivity for longer periods of time without needing to frequently plug en-
ergy hungry smart phones to electrical sockets for charging. Coalitional game theory
is applied to resolve arising conflict of interest between players and keep them moti-
vated to cooperate. Inside a coalition, LP techniques are applied to solve relay selection
problem, that intrinsically matches relay and source nodes in a way that maximises the
coalition’s payoff. Furthermore, necessary algorithms are provided to help implement
necessary energy saving features at the UEs and at the RAN. Finally, the chapter
concludes by validating this coalition game approach through both MATLAB and NS2
simulations results.
• Chapter 4 addresses DSM in the smart grid, adopting a game-theoretic approach. In
particular, we apply a two-stage extensive form game where in the first stage, the util-
ity company takes action choosing a certain time-dependent real-time tariff for the next
hour(s) and announces the price(s) over the underlying two-way communication links,
established by the smart grid. Observing the action taken by the utility company (i.e.,
the price signal), the consumers react by optimising the running schedules of their ap-
pliances so as to minimise their daily energy costs while meeting their satisfaction levels.
We specifically study Day-Ahead Pricing (DAP) and convex pricing tariffs and attain
strategic responses of a smart home for any of these pricing strategies that achieves
the NE. We capture these responses as appropriate linear and convex programming
problems to schedule smart home appliances for a price-aware domestic consumer. This
chapter concludes by numerically validating our game-theoretic approach and the pro-
posed household appliance scheduling algorithms through our custom-made MATLAB
simulator.
• Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this PhD thesis, summarising the main results and drawing
some guidelines for future work directions.
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Chapter 2
Game Theory for 5G Applications
This chapter presents the essential background on game theory and its potential applica-
tions to boost the performance of 5G mobile networks and smart power grids. The chapter
provides definitions of different types of games that could be employed to improve scarce
resource utilisation in 5G applications along with necessary techniques to solve them. It
further provides a brief introduction to mathematical optimisation, highlighting fundamental
differences between a game-theoretic approach and a mathematical optimisation approach
for addressing resource management problems. Game theory essentially addresses strategic
interactions of independent rational agents, called players, who seek to maximise their own
payoff. As the intelligence of mobile communication systems continuously increases, we ex-
pect 5G systems to host a portfolio of smart devices that can behave like rational players
when they interact for instance to access the wireless medium, to relay packets, or to serve
as an information backbone for smart home appliances to interact with the utility company
and coordinate their operating intervals (schedules) in order to help manage household en-
ergy consumption and utilise the power grid infrastructure more efficiently. This can enable
distributed management of scarce resources with practical signalling and coordination burden
while ensuring a satisfactory performance.
2.1 Introduction
Game theory [31–33, 42] is essentially a mathematical tool to model and analyse potential
conflict of interest arising from strategic interactions of multiple independent decision makers,
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any of whom seeking to maximise their own payoff. The decision makers, which are called
players, are generally assumed to be rational and independent agents. The interest of players,
which is generally independent from the interest of their opponents, might be in either helping
or hurting their opponents: the former leads to cooperation among players, while the latter
leads to competition among them. Specifically, when a player gains what her opponent loses,
the game is called a zero-sum game. As a generalisation of the zero-sum game, the sum of
the payoffs that players receive might be constant so if a player wants to increase her own
payoff, she will need to upset at least one of her opponents.
A game is composed of at least two players. Every player, has a set of strategies and a
utility function. The utility function is a function that simply maps the strategy space, S,
to the set of real numbers, R, and serves as a measure to reflect the preference of players for
their strategies. That is, players can use their utility functions to assess the usefulness of their
different strategies; the more the value of a utility function for a certain strategy, the more
the usefulness of that strategy for that player. In general, the utility that a player gains from
playing a specific strategy might depend not only on the strategy that she chooses but also
on the strategies that her opponents choose. Therefore, players may change their strategies
sequentially in response to the strategic moves of their opponents. This can result in a set
of dynamic decision-making interactions, which might evolve until an equilibrium strategy is
reached for all players.
In 5G applications, we might use game theory to model either cooperative or competi-
tive interactions among players. Sometimes the interest of players is to cooperate, whereas
there are some other occasions, such as in zero-sum games, where their interest is to defeat
their opponents. Originated by these applications, games are sometimes categorised as non-
cooperative and cooperative games. Although, in the latter, players try to coordinate their
actions with their opponents, both of these categories are used to capture strategic interac-
tions of rational and independent agents. We normally model a competitive situation using
strategic form games (Section 2.2) (also called non-cooperative games), while we can model a
cooperative situation as either a strategic form game or a coalitional game (Section 2.5). The
essential difference between a strategic form game and a coalitional game is that in the lat-
ter the players can enforce binding agreements among themselves in order to maximise their
common (i.e., aggregate) payoff, while in the former the players are not allowed to enforce
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such binding agreements and pursue to maximise their individual payoffs. More precisely, in
a strategic form game with complete information, every player completely knows the strategy
sets of herself and her opponents as well her and her opponents’ payoffs from any strategic
outcome. We call the Cartesian product of the strategy sets of all players as the strategy
space; any member of this set is called a game outcome or a strategy profile.
Our main concern in solving a strategic form game is predicting the equilibrium strategy
profile that the players will finally reach. This equilibrium strategy profile is given by the NE
(Section 2.2), named after John Nash who first introduced this solution reasoning method to
the literature [43, 44]. NE is by definition a joint strategy in which each player’s strategy
is the best response to her opponent’s strategy. In fact, an NE is an action profile in which
none of the players could improve their payoff by a unilateral deviation while other players
adhere to it [42]. As a result, when the game is at NE, the players are reluctant to change
their strategies unilaterally. Note that a game might have multiple NEs. On the other hand,
the equilibrium concept for a coalitional game is quite different. In fact, there are two main
parts in the problem concerning the equilibrium of a coalitional game: the first part is finding
a proper interaction among players in order to lead them to the most beneficial cooperation,
and the second part is sharing the common achieved payoff among players in such a way
that they are all satisfied and motivated to keep cooperating on instead of defecting and
acting individually [33, 45]. In addressing coalitional games, each of these two parts might
be tackled using a different approach: the first part is basically a resource management (or,
decision making) problem, which typically leads to a network optimisation problem, and
can be solved using mathematical optimisation tools (Section 2.6). The second part of the
problem however concerns a fair distribution of the common payoff among players that can
be tackled using solution concepts of coalitional games, such as core (Section 2.5.1), Shapley
value (Section 2.5.2) and so forth. In the following, we will discuss these solution concepts
with further details.
Interacting as independent agents while cooperating or competing for efficient resource
utilisation, conflict of interest naturally arises among mobile UEs or smart home appliances.
We can use game theory [33–35, 39] to analyse these conflicts of interest and predict the
strategic decisions of the players (i.e., UEs or appliances and the utility company) [37, 46–
52]. Specifically, as cooperative paradigm gains momentum in wireless networks, coalitional
20 Chapter 2. Game Theory for 5G Applications
game theory has attracted considerable amount of interest among wireless engineers and
researchers in recent years (see [37, 50, 50–53] and references therein). As mentioned above,
solving a coalitional game means incentivising all players by distributing the common payoff
that the players obtain by their cooperation in a fair way where they are all satisfied and
no player or group of players has incentive to exit the cooperation. Further detail about
coalitional game theory is provided later on in Section 2.5.
2.2 Strategic Form Games
A game in strategic form1, also called normal form, has three elements [32]:
• the set of players n ∈ N , which we consider to be the finite set {1, 2, ..., N}, where
N = |N | is the cardinality of the set N and indicates the number of players.
• the pure-strategy set Sn for each player n ∈ N .
• the payoff function un : S → R for each player n ∈ N that gives player n’s utility for
each strategy profile s = (s1, ..., sN ) ∈ S, where S is the cartesian product of all strategy
sets; i.e., S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn.
We will frequently discuss varying the strategy of a single player n ∈ N while holding the
strategy of her opponents fixed. To do so, we let s−n ∈ S−n denote a strategy selection for
all players except n and write (s′n, s−n) for the strategy profile (s1, ..., sn−1, s′n, sn+1, ..., sN ).
Similarly, for mixed strategies, we let (σ′n, σ−n) = (σ1, ..., σn−1, σ′n, σn+1, ..., σN ). A mixed
strategy of a player is simply defined as a probability distribution over all her pure strategies
[32]. In other words, a mixed strategy is a randomisation over the pure strategies. For
instance, a player, i, having only two pure strategies, Si = {A,B}, may decide to choose
strategy A with probablity p and strategy B with probablity 1 − p. In this case, her mixed
strategy will be σi = {p, 1− p}.
Definition 2.1. Pure strategy sn is strictly dominated [32] for player n if there exists σ
′
n ∈ Σn
such that
un(σ
′
n, σ−n) > un(sn, s−n), ∀s−n ∈ S−n. (2.1)
1Strategic form games are also called non-cooperative games in the literature.
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Figure 2.1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Player 2
C D
Player 1
C 1,1 -1,2
D 2,-1 0,0
The strategy sn is weakly dominated if there exists a σ
′
n such that inequality 2.1 holds with
weak inequality, and the inequality is strict for at least one s−n.
Nash Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that each player’s strategy is a best response
to her opponents’ strategies [43, 44].
Definition 2.2. A mixed-strategy profile σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium if, for all players n ∈ N
[32],
un(σ
∗
n, σ
∗
−n) > un(sn, σ
∗
−n), ∀sn ∈ Sn. (2.2)
Example 2.1. As an example for strategic form games, Figure 2.1 shows the “Prisoner’s
Dilemma” game. This game has two players, namely Player 1 and Player 2. Thus, the set
of players is N = {Player 1, Player 2}. Every player has two strategies, namely Cooperate
and Defect, represented by s1=C and s2=D, respectively. For this specific game the strategy
sets of the players are equal and given by S1 = S2 = {C,D}. However, note that this is not
the case for all games and in general players of a game might have different strategy sets.
There are four possible strategic outcomes (strategy profiles) for this game; they form the
strategy space of the game as follows S = S1 × S2 = {(C,C), (D,C), (C,D), (D,D)}, where
the times symbol depicts the Cartesian product of the two sets. In this game, strategy C is
strictly dominated by strategy D, for both players. Therefore, the game has a unique NE
that is (D,D). The utility functions for Player 1, u1, and for Player 2, u2, map these strategic
outcomes to the set of real numbers as depicted in Figure 2.1.
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u1(C,C) = 1 u2(C,C) = 1
u1(C,D) = −1 u2(C,D) = 2
u1(D,C) = 2 u2(D,C) = −1
u1(D,D) = 0 u2(D,D) = 0
2.3 Market Competition Models
We may model a market as one of the following three economic models: monopoly,
oligopoly, or perfect competition [54]. A situation where a market is dominated by a sin-
gle provider is known as a monopoly. Essentially, there is no competition in a monopolistic
marker, and it is the only provider that decides which quantity to provide (q) or which price
to sell (p) – it controls the output quantity to maximise its revenue. In the other extreme,
we can think of (perfectly) competitive markets, where there are many providers and many
consumers. Such markets naturally end up at an equilibrium point where the quantity sup-
plied is equal to the quantity demanded. It is indeed this equilibrium that determines the
prevailing price in the market. There is still a third form of market which is located between
these two extremes, called oligopoly. In an oligopolistic market, there is a limited competition
between few providers dominating the market. The simplest form of an oligopolistic market
with only two providers is called a duopoly.
2.3.1 Pareto Efficiency
When a player improves her payoff without harming her opponents, the action is called
a Pareto improvement move [55]. A Pareto efficient2 outcome occurs when no player can
improve her payoff without hurting her opponents’ payoffs – there is no more room for Pareto
improvement. We should distinguish a Pareto efficient outcome from a socially optimal out-
come that occurs when the social welfare, sum of the payoffs for all players, reaches its
maximum. For instance, in the Prisoner’s dilemma game depicted in Figure 2.1, (C,C) and
2Also called Pareto optimal.
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(D,D) are both Pareto optimal since none of the players has a Pareto improvement move.
However, the game has only one socially optimal outcome which is (C,C). In fact, the game is
called a ‘dilemma’ since the NE of the game is to defect while the socially optimal outcome,
where both players are better off, is to cooperate.
2.3.2 Cournot Game
Cournot game [56] is an economic model of a duopoly producing a homogeneous product3.
The strategies are quantities. Firm 1 and firm 2 simultaneously choose their respective output
levels, qi. They sell their outputs at the market clearing price p(q), where q = q1 + q2. Firm
i’s cost of production is ci(qi), and its payoff is ui(q1, q2) = qip(q) − ci(qi). Cournot game is
a two-player strategic form game, and its NE is called the Cournot equilibrium.
2.3.3 Bertrand Game
In the Bertrand model [57], firms simultaneously choose prices and then must produce
enough to meet the demand after the price choices become known in the market.
2.4 Extensive Form Games
In strategic from games, players have no notion about the “time.” They move once and
choose their strategies simultaneously. However, there exist situations where players move in
a time order. Extensive form games are used to model such dynamic situations [31, 58]. They
make explicit the order in which players move, and what each player knows when making
each of her decisions. An example of a game in extensive form is the “Stackelberg game,”
elaborated in the following subsection.
Stackelberg Game
Similar to the Cournot game, Stackelberg game [59] is a model for a duopolistic compe-
tition. As in the Cournot game, there are two firms competing on the market share for a
homogeneous product. The actions of the firms are choices of their output quantities, q1 for
3Homogeneous products are defined by the BusinessDictionary as the goods that compete with each other
in a market but which (from the consumer’s viewpoint) have little or no differentiation in terms of features,
benefits, or quality and are, therefore, forced to compete on price or availability.
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firm 1 and q2 for firm 2. The only difference is that we now suppose that firm 1 has the
leadership power, while firm 2 is just a follower. That is, firm 1, “the Stackelberg leader,”
moves first and chooses its output level q1, whereas firm 2 observes q1 before choosing its own
output level q2.
2.5 Coalitional Games
In contrast to strategic form games where there is no communication between players,
coalitional games are referred to those games that analyse conflict of interest among rational
players who can communicate and make coalitions to improve their individual and group
payoffs [33, 45]. For example, in wireless networks, UEs may form coalitions and pool their
resources (e.g., their batteries, radio interfaces, etc.) and perform their tasks (i.e., communi-
cating with the RAN) cooperatively whenever doing so can improve their resource utilisation
efficiency (e.g., save their battery energy). In the following, we describe coalitional games
along with their solution concepts.
If players of a game can enforce binding agreements to pursue group strategies and max-
imise their common payoff, the game is called a coalitional game. Formally, a coalitional game
is defined as an ordered pair 〈N , v〉 where N = {1, . . . , N} is the set of players and v : 2N → R
is called the characteristic function; R denotes the set of real numbers and 2N denotes the
power set of N , which is defined as the set of all subsets of N involving the empty set and the
set N itself. Any subset of N is called a ‘coalition’, and the set involving all players is called
the ‘grand’ coalition. Note that N = |N | and 2N = |2N |, where the vertical bars denote sets’
cardinalities. The characteristic function v, which is a function from the power set of N (i.e.,
2N ) to the set of real numbers, assigns any coalition S⊆N a real number v(S), called the
worth of coalition S. By convention, v(∅) = 0, where ∅ denotes the empty set. The worth of
a coalition indeed indicates the maximum payoff that the players of the coalition can obtain
by their full cooperation.
For any coalition S, if v(S) depends only on the actions of players inside S without being
affected by the activities of the rest of players who lie outside S (i.e., inside N\S), the function
v is called the characteristic function and the game is referred to as a game in characteristic
function form. Otherwise, if v(S) depends not only on the activities of players inside S, but
also on the activities of the rest of players who lie outside S (i.e., inside N\S), then the
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function v is called a partition function and the game is referred to as a game in partition
function form. As mentioned above, the value of a coalition S retuned by the characteristic
function or the partition function (i.e., v(S)) is called the worth of coalition S and indicates
the maximum payoff the players in S can achieve by their cooperation. Putting differently,
in a characteristic function game, the worth of a coalition depends only on the members of
the coalition and is independent from how the rest of players outside the coalition organise
themselves, while in a partition function game, the worth of a coalition depends not only
on the coordination of the members of the coalition but also on how other players outside
the coalition organise themselves. Thus, in a partition function game, forming a coalition
might have side effects on other coalitions, referred to as externalities. We have two kinds
of externalities in general: positive externality and negative externality. Positive externality
means that forming a coalition increases the worth of other coalitions, while in case of negative
externality, forming a coalition reduces the worth of other coalitions.
When a game involves ‘monetary’ or physically exchangeable units that can be freely
exchanged between players, the game is called a game with Transferable Utility (TU). A
game that lacks this kind of freely exchangeable unit is called a game with Non-Transferable
Utility (NTU). Essentially, a game with TU is more flexible than a game with NTU and
allows the common payoff to be distributed among players in an arbitrary way.
A game, G = 〈N , v〉, is called a superadditive game [33] if ∀ S, T ⊆ N and S ∩ T 6= ∅,
then
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ). (2.3)
That is, two arbitrary disjoint coalitions can always improve their position in the game by
merging and forming a bigger coalition. In contrast, a game, G = 〈N , v〉, is called a convex
game if ∀ S, T ⊆ N , then
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T )− v(S ∩ T ). (2.4)
Equivalently, for an arbitrary player i ∈ N of the convex game G = 〈N , v〉
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ), ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ N\{i}. (2.5)
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The left and right hand sides are the marginal contributions of player i ∈ N to coalitions S and
T , respectively. This inequality indicates that in a convex game, the marginal contribution
of a player to a coalition always increases as the coalition size grows; the more the size of the
coalition, the more the marginal contribution of a new player.
Convex games are indeed a subset of superadditive games; any convex game is superaddi-
tive too, but the converse may not be true [33]. It is worth mentioning that in a superadditive
game, players tend to join together and form the grand coalition. This type of game where
the grand coalition is trivial is referred to as the ‘canonical’ game. In a canonical game, the
only concern is the stability of the coalition. That is, how to divide the common payoff among
players such that everyone is happy and no one has incentive to leave the coalition.
Any distribution of the common payoff among players is called a payoff vector, or an
allocation, vector. A payoff vector of a coalitional game is generally denoted by the vector
x = (x1, . . . , xn) where xi (i = 1, . . . , N) denotes the amount of assigned payoff to player
i ∈ N .
A payoff vector x ∈ RN is called feasible if
∑
i∈N
xi ≤ v(N ). (2.6)
Furthermore, a payoff vector x ∈ RN is called efficient or Pareto optimal if it distributes the
worth of the grand coalition among players totally; i.e.,
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ). (2.7)
A payoff vector x ∈ RN is called individually rational if it offers all players more payoffs
than what they can obtain acting individually; i.e.,
xi ≥ v(i), ∀i ∈ N . (2.8)
Note that with an abuse of notation, we use v(i) to denote v({i}). While distributing the
common payoff, v(N ), among the players, a rational player i ∈ N always compares the payoff
she receives from the allocation vector, xi, with the payoff that she can obtain by acting
individually, v(i). The player will prefer to cooperate if xi ≥ v(i); otherwise, she will decide
2.5. Coalitional Games 27
to leave the coalition since she can obtain more by acting individually. Hence, the first step
towards ensuring the stability of a coalition is to offer each player at least a payoff that they
can obtain individually – an individually rational payoff vector.
The ‘excess’ [33] of a coalition S ⊆ N under an allocation vector x is defined as
e(S, x) = v(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi. (2.9)
That is, the excess of coalition S ⊆ N with respect to payoff vector x is the net transferrable
worth that S ⊆ N would have left after paying xi to each member i ∈ N . Furthermore, it is
worth pointing out that for a canonical game, a payoff vector is efficient if the excess of the
grand coalition under this allocation vector is zero.
In contrast to individual rationality, a payoff vector x is called group rational if for any
coalition S ⊆ N , ∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S). (2.10)
Thus, a payoff vector is group rational if the excess of every coalition is either negative or
equal to zero.
The ‘pre-imputation’ set PI(v) ⊆ Rn is defined as the subset of Rn comprised of all
efficient payoff vectors; i.e.,
PI(v) =
{
x ∈ Rn |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N )
}
. (2.11)
Furthermore, the ‘imputation’ set I(v) ⊆ Rn is defined as the subset of Rn that comprises all
efficient and individually rational payoff vectors; i.e.,
I(v) =
{
x ∈ Rn |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ), xi ≥ v(i), ∀i ∈ N
}
. (2.12)
Suppose that G = 〈N , v〉 is a game with TU and the set P is a partition of N . We define
I(P) =
{
x ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∑
i∈C
xi = v(C), ∀C ∈ P and xi ≥ v(i), ∀i ∈ N
}
. (2.13)
One can immediately notice that if P = N (i.e., the partition consists of only one part,
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namely the grand coalition N ), then I(P) is nothing but the set of all imputations of the
game G = 〈N , v〉; cf (2.12).
An ‘objection’ by a player i ∈ N against another player j ∈ N and a payoff allocation x
is a pair (y, C) where y is another payoff allocation and C is a coalition such that
i ∈ C, j /∈ C, e(C, y) = 0 ∀y >C x. (2.14)
That is, the players in C can jointly achieve their share of y, which is strictly better for all
of them, including player i ∈ N , than the allocation x. A counter objection to i’s objection
(y, C) against j and x is any pair (z,D) such that
j ∈ D, i /∈ D, C ∩ D 6= ∅, e(D, z) = 0, z≥D x, z≥C∩D y. (2.15)
That is, in the counter objection, player j can form a coalition D that takes away some of
i’s partners in the objection (but not i himself) and makes them at least as well off as in the
objection; thus, j can restore himself and the other members of D to payoffs at least as good
as they had in x.
For any two payoff vectors x and y and any coalition S, if x is strictly preferred to y by
all members of coalition S, x is called lexicographically larger than y. That is,
x >C y iff xi >C yi ∀i ∈ S. (2.16)
Similarly, we can write
x ≥C y iff xi ≥C yi ∀i ∈ S. (2.17)
A solution concept of a cooperative game is generally defined as a set of payoff vectors
that all of the involved players of the game are satisfied by its proposed allocation and none
of them has enough incentive to break the cooperation. Several solution concepts have been
developed in the literature, namely core, Shapley value, stable set, bargaining set as well as
kernel [33]. In the following, the definitions of these solution concepts are briefly provided.
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2.5.1 Core Solution
The core solution is defined as the set of payoff vectors that are feasible and group rational
(i.e., cannot be improved upon by any other coalition). That is [33],
C(v) =
{
x ∈ Rn |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ),
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊂ N
}
. (2.18)
Example 2.2. Consider a game with three players N = {1, 2, 3} and the following charac-
teristic function.
v(1) = 0.25
v(2) = 0
v(3) = −0.25
v(1, 2) = 1.25
v(1, 3) = 1.0
v(2, 3) = 0.75
v(1, 2, 3) = 2.0
The game is super-additive because:
v(1, 2) ≥ v(1) + v(2)
v(1, 3) ≥ v(1) + v(3)
v(2, 3) ≥ v(2) + v(3)
v(1, 2, 3) ≥ v(1, 2) + v(3)
v(1, 2, 3) ≥ v(1, 3) + v(2)
v(1, 2, 3) ≥ v(2, 3) + v(1)
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The game is also convex since in addition to the above inequalities:
v(1, 2, 3) + v(1) ≥ v(1, 2) + v(1, 3)
v(1, 2, 3) + v(2) ≥ v(1, 2) + v(2, 3)
v(1, 2, 3) + v(3) ≥ v(1, 3) + v(2, 3)
Furthermore, the core solution is any vector x = (x1, x2, x3) that satisfies the following
conditions:
x1 ≥ 0.25
x2 ≥ 0
x3 ≥ −0.25
x1 + x2 ≥ 1.25
x1 + x3 ≥ 1.0
x2 + x3 ≥ 0.75
x1 + x2 + x3 = 2.0
For example, (1,1,0), (1,0.25,0.75), and (1.25,0.5,0.25) are all located in the core. It is clear
in this example that the core solution is not unique; rather there can be several core solutions
pertaining to a game. In fact, the core of a coalitional game can also be empty. However, the
core of a convex game is always nonempty. Moreover, the core solution of a coalitional game
is a (possibly empty) convex polytope in Rn [45]. The core solution provides all solutions
including the edge points of this convex polytope. Other solution concepts exist such as the
Nucleolus or the Kernel, which derive interior solutions from this polytope. Further discussion
on these solution concepts is out of the scope of this chapter. The interested readers can refer
to the textbooks on game theory such as [33].
2.5.2 Shapley Value
The core of a coalitional game may be empty or quite large, a situation that makes the
core difficult to apply as a predictive theory. The best that we could hope for would be to
derive a theory that predicts, for each game in coalitional form, a unique expected payoff
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allocation for the players. Shapley approached this problem axiomatically [60, 61]. That is,
he asked what kind of properties we might expect such a solution concept to satisfy, and
characterised the mappings φ that satisfy the following four axioms [33]:
1. Efficiency Axiom:
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N ).
2. Symmetry Axiom: If players i and j are such that v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for every
coalition S ⊆ N\{i, j}, not containing players i and j, then φi(v) = φj(v).
3. Dummy Axiom: If player i is such that v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for every coalition S ⊆ N\i,
not containing player i, then φi(v) = 0.
4. Additivity Axiom: If u and v are characteristic functions, then φ(u+ v) = φ(u) + φ(v).
Shapley showed that there is a unique mapping φ – called the Shapley value – that satisfies
these four axioms. This value is computed for every player i of the game (N , v) in the following
manner.
φi(v) =
∑
S∈N\{i}
|S|!|N − S − 1|!
|N |! [v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)] (2.19)
The Shapley value has an interpretation that takes into account the order in which the players
join the grand coalition N . When the players join the grand coalition in a random order, the
payoff allotted by the Shapley value to a player i ∈ N is the expected marginal contribution
of player i.
2.5.3 Stable Set
A stable set is also called a von-Neumann-Morgenstern solution. By definition, a stable
set is the set of imputations Z that satisfies the following two stability conditions:
• internal stability, which means that no imputation in Z is dominated by any other
imputation in Z;
• external stability, which means that every imputation not in Z is dominated by some
imputation in Z.
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2.5.4 Bargaining Set
The intuition behind the bargaining set solution is that the common payoff of the cooper-
ation is distributed among players in such a way that any player would refrain from objecting
to a proposed payoff allocation because of the apprehension that the objection might prompt
a counter objection by another player. Formally, a barging set solution is defined as follows.
Given a TU game G = 〈N , v〉 and a partition P of N , a bargaining set is a collection of payoff
vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn) such that [33]:
• x belongs to the set I(P), i.e., the imputation set;
• for any coalition C ⊆ P and for any two players i, j ∈ C, there is a counter objection to
any objection by i against player j and payoff vector x.
2.5.5 Kernel
Similar to the bargaining set solution, the kernel of a cooperative game is defined relative
to a partition P of the grand coalition N . In fact, like the bargaining set, the kernel is also
a subset of I(P). The intuition behind the kernel is that if two players i and j belong to the
same coalition in P, then the highest excess that i can make in a coalition without j should
be the same as the highest excess that j can make in a coalition without i. The kernel is
always a nonempty subset of the bargaining set and is formally defined as follows.
The kernel of a TU game G = 〈N , v〉 related to a partition P of N , is composed of all
payoff vectors x that [33]:
• x ∈ I(P); and
• for any coalition C ∈ P and any two players i, j ∈ C,
max
S⊆N\j,i∈S
e(S, x) = max
T ⊆N\i,j∈T
e(T , x). (2.20)
2.5.6 Nucleolus
The essential motivation behind nucleolus is that instead of applying general fairness
axioms for finding a unique payoff allocation, one can provide an allocation that minimises
the dissatisfaction of the players from the allocation they can receive in a given game. For
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a coalition S, the measure of dissatisfaction from an allocation x is defined as the excess
e(S, x). Hence, this solution concept is defined as follows. The nucleolus is the imputation
that minimises the
• largest excess among all coalitions;
• second largest excess among all coalitions, and so on until a unique imputation is
reached.
Intuitively, nucleolus makes the most unhappy coalition as little unhappy as possible, the
second most unhappy coalition as little unhappy as possible, and so on. Nucleolus can be
computed by solving a collection of LP problems in a sequential way. The nucleolus is in the
kernel, in the bargaining set with the partition P = N and in the core if the core is nonempty.
2.6 Mathematical Optimisation
Mathematical optimisation is referred to a set of problems that aim to minimise (or max-
imise) an objective function, which depends on a set of optimisation variables, subject to
meeting some constraint functions defining the feasible set for the variables space [62]. Gen-
erally, the objective function and the constraints can take various forms (e.g., linear, affine,
convex, etc.). Depending on the form of the objective and constraint functions as well as the
feasible values that the decison variables can take, optimisation problems demonstrate them-
selves in several different types. For any type of optimisation problem, there exist different
solution techniques and algorithms. In general, we may write an optimisation problem as
follows:
minimise
x
f0(x)
subject to: fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m
hi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p
(2.21)
We denote the optimal solution of this problem as x?. In the following, we briefly introduce
different optimisation problems.
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2.6.1 Linear Programming
LP is referred to a type of optimisation problem where both the objective function and
the constraint functions are affine (loosely speaking, linear) functions [62]. A set C ⊆ Rn is
affine if the line through any two points in C lies in C. A function f : Rn → R is affine if
dom f , where dom f denotes the domain of f , is an affine set and if for all x, y ∈ domf ,
and θ ∈ R, we have
f(θx+ (1− θ)y) = θf(x) + (1− θ)f(y). (2.22)
If the decision variables xi can only take binary values, indicating a kind of “yes/no” decision,
the LP problem is called a Binary Programming problem. If they are forced to take only
integer values, the resulting problem is called an Integer Programming problem. If they can
take either real or integer values, the problem is called a Mixed Integer Linear Programming
(MILP) problem.
In Eq. (2.21), the first line expresses the objective function, which indicates minimising
the cost of performing a certain task. This is the standard form notation of an LP problem,
normally written in a minimisation form; to maximise an objective function (i.e., profit), we
may simply minimise its negative. The constraint inequalities basically indicate the limits on
the available resources for performing the task. The region enclosed by the inequalities, the
feasible region, which determines the region from where the optimal solution can be selected.
The LP problem could be solved by the well-known simplex algorithm [63]. The system of
linear inequalities composing the constraints indeed defines a polytope, as the feasible region,
and the simplex algorithm relies on the fact that the optimal feasible solution lies at the corner
points of this polytope. The algorithm, begins at a starting vertex and moves along the edges
of the polytope in the opposite direction of the gradient of the objective function until it
reaches the optimum corner point. Since passing from one vertex to another is performed
in the negative direction of the gradient of the objective function, the algorithm reaches the
optimal solution quickly without having to check all corner points – although in worst case,
it may have to check all corner points to find the optimal solution [64].
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Sometimes it is convenient to show an LP problem in a matrix format.
minimise
x
cTx
subject to: Ax ≤ b
(2.23)
Here, cT is a row vector with the same length as vector x (i.e., n); A is a matrix of size m×n,
and b is a column vector of length m.
We can now construct the dual of this LP problem as follows:
maximise
x
bT y
subject to: AT y ≥ c,
(2.24)
where y is the dual variable which is a column vector of size m. We denote the optimal solution
of this LP problem as y?. The interesting relationship between the primal LP problem and
its dual is stated by the duality theorem [63].
Theorem 2.1. If an optimal feasible solutions exist for the primal problem and its corre-
sponding dual problem, then these optimal values are equal; i.e., x? = y?.
2.6.2 Convex Optimisation
Convex Optimisation [62] is referred to a set of optimisation problems where both the ob-
jective function f0 and all constraint functions (either inequality functions fis or the equality
ones his) are convex functions [62]. A set C ⊆ Rn is convex if the line chord through any two
points in C lies in C. A function f : Rn → R is convex if dom f , where dom f denotes the
domain of f , is a convex set and if for all x, y ∈ domf , and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, we have
f(θx+ (1− θ)y) ≤ θf(x) + (1− θ)f(y). (2.25)
Interior-Point Methods (IPM) is an efficient algorithm that can solve Convex problems in
complexity of O(nm) [62].
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2.7 Game Theory for Wireless Networks
Game theory has recently been applied to wireless networks, particularly on ad hoc and
cognitive networks. Wang et al. [65] present a tutorial on the applications of game theory
on cognitive radio networks. Srivastava et al. [46] survey the applications of game theory
for analysing wireless ad hoc networks. These two papers provide a comprehensive list of
references on the applications of game theory in wireless networks. There are also some
other tutorial papers on the applications of game theory in wireless networks such as [34, 37]:
Fe´legyha´zi & Hubaux [34] address the application of strategic form games, while Saad et al.
[37] address the applications of coalitional games in wireless network. Fe´legyha´zi et al. [47]
address the problem of whether cooperation can exist in ad hoc network without incentive
mechanisms. They propose a model based on repeated games and graph theory and investigate
equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding strategies in Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET).
They conclude that it is difficult for global natural cooperation to emerge in a static network
scenario since the asymmetric relationships between nodes never change and nodes have
not any incentive to forward the packets of the nodes that can never reciprocate (or be
punished). This motivates a study of the potential for natural cooperation in non-static
scenarios considering mobility models. Mobility is likely to be a key factor in enabling natural
cooperation as it allows different dependency loops to be established over time. Furthermore,
Yang et al. [48] address noncooperative game analysis of selfish behaviour in wireless ad hoc
networks with a focus on packet forwarding and relaying. They model two-, three- and four-
player Packet Forwarding Dilemma (PFD) as a repeated game and demonstrate that natural
cooperation can emerge under these conditions: (i) repeated game with uncertain ending; (ii)
credible punishment for defection; and (iii) sufficiently patient players. These conditions may
not hold in all networks; hence, there is always a role for extrinsic incentive mechanisms.
Packet Forwarding Dilemma
In ad hoc networks, the proper operation of the network relies on the cooperation of the
nodes in forwarding packets of each other. On the other hand, packet forwarding incurs energy
cost for relaying nodes. Hence, rational nodes face a dilemma called PFD [47, 48],which can
be modelled as a two-player strategic form game. Suppose forwarding a packet has a cost of
C < 1 for the forwarding node and a benefit of 1 for the packet owner. Every player has two
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Figure 2.2: The ‘Packet Forwarding Dilemma’ Game
Node 2
Forward Drop
Node 1
Forward 1-C,1-C -C,1
Drop 1,-C 0,0
alternative strategies in response to a packet-forwarding request from her opponent: Forward
and Drop. Figure 2.2 illustrates the game.
As defined before, NE is a strategic action profile that no player can increase her payoff
by unilaterally deviating from it. In the PFD game represented in Figure 2.2, the only pure
strategy Nash equilibrium is (Drop,Drop). Nonetheless, similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, there is another action profile that is more beneficial for both players, which is (For-
ward,Forward). Again, this is a Pareto optimal action profile. The reason that prevents
players from playing this strategic action profile, although it is more socially attractive for
them, is that any player fear that the opponent would be tempted to unilaterally change her
strategy to further increase her payoff. In fact, this deviation of the opponent from the Pareto
optimal outcome (Forwad,Forwad) leaves the cooperating player a payoff that is worse than
the one he receives in the NE.
Repeated Games
As defined before, in a strategic game, if players have to perform a single strategic move,
the game is called static or a single stage game. However, if they can perform several strategic
moves, the game is called a multi-stage or a repeated game. That is, in a repeated game, the
players interact several times. Each of these interactions is called a stage, and any stage can
be modelled as a static (single-stage) game. In repeated games, players are assured that they
will encounter again in the next stages of the game. Hence, if a player deviates from a Pareto
optimal action profile, the opponent can change her strategy accordingly in the following
stages of the game. As a result, players have more diverse strategic choices than they have in
a static game [47–49]. Next, we briefly describe some of these possible strategies [47].
• Always Cooperate (AllC): a player always forwards the packet regardless of the strategy
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of her opponent.
• Always Defect (AllD): a player always drops the packet regardless of the strategy of her
opponent.
• Tit-For-Tat (TFT): a player forwards the first packet and then mimics the strategy of
her opponent.
• Suspicious Tit-For-Tat (S-TFT): a player drops the first packet and then mimics the
strategy of her opponent.
• Anti Tit-For-Tat (A-TFT): a player always does the opposite of her opponent’s strategy.
That is, if the opponent drops (forwards) her packet, he forwards (drops) the packet of
the opponent.
• Grim Trigger (GT): a player forwards the packets of her opponent until the opponent
forwards her packets. Once the opponent drops her packet, he drops all packets from
her opponent forever.
• Generous Tit-For-Tat (G-TFT): a player adopts the TFT strategy, but he is slightly
generous and forgives some occasional dropping by her opponent.
• Random: a player forwards the packet of her opponent with probability 12 .
2.8 Cooperative Communications
The existing literature on cooperative communication can be classified into two main cat-
egories: multihop communication and cooperative relaying. The former is primarily employed
in ad hoc networks to ensure connectivity in the absence of a communication infrastructure.
In this form of cooperation, wireless nodes cooperate by forwarding data packets for each
other. As such, two nodes that are out of their radio coverage are still able to communicate
through some intermediate relay nodes (see Figure 2.3(a)). The Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) MANET working group develops standards for IP routing protocol suitable for
wireless routing application within both static and dynamic topologies. The second from of
cooperative communication is cooperative relaying. In contrast to multihop communication
(Figure 2.3(b)), the main motivation for this form of cooperation is not connectivity. Rather,
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Figure 2.3: Contrasting multihop communication (a) and cooperative relaying (b)
it is employed to exploit the underlying spatial diversity of the wireless channel to enhance
the system performance including the link reliability, data rate, and energy efficiency.
Figure 2.3 contrasts the two above-mentioned types of cooperative communication. The
main difference between these two types is that, in multihop relaying (Figure 2.3(a)), there is
no direct link between the source node S and the destination node D, so the communication
between theses end-nodes is to be performed through the relay node R. In contrast, in co-
operative relaying (Figure 2.3(b)), there exists a direct link between the two communication
parties, and the relay path serves as an alternative path to add spatial degree-of-freedom.
Figure 2.4 depicts a snapshot of the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) variations of the direct path
〈S-D〉 and the relay path 〈S-R-D〉, caused by the shadowing and multipath fading impair-
ments. As seen in the figure, there are some time instants that the received SNR drops to
the acceptable threshold for reliable detection. The light-shaded regions illustrate these time
intervals. As the variations of the perceived SNR from the two alternative paths 〈S-D〉 and
〈S-R-D〉 at the destination node D are statistically independent, the probability that the both
links are in a deep fading is very low, illustrated by the dark shaded regions in the figure.
In a multihop cellular network, the relaying action can be performed either in the same
frequency band as the cellular system or in a different frequency band. In the first approach,
which is called in-band relaying, both hops from the source node to the relay node and
from the relay node to the destination node are performed over the same frequency channel,
but in different time slots. More precisely, they share the same frequency dimension by
multiplexing over other dimensions such as time (Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)),
code (Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)), etc. Although in-band relaying requires
minimal additional complexity for the UEs, the receiver and transmitter at the relay node
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cannot operate simultaneously. This constrains the relay to operate in half-duplex mode,
reducing the link capacity to half. On the other hand, in out-of-band relaying, the first
hop (i.e. from the source node to the relay) operates at different frequency band than the
second hop (i.e. from the relay to the destination), allowing “full-duplex” operation for the
relay nodes. However, this scheme requires an additional frequency channel as well as good
isolation between the transmit and receive signals.
Despite operating in orthogonal channels, in out-of-band relaying, the transmit signal
drowns out the receive signal, due to imperfect isolation (typically, the transmit signal is 100-
150 dB above the receive signal). This requires two radio interfaces at the relay node. Today,
any feature phone or smart phone is equipped with a variety of radio interfaces. Therefore, a
plausible solution for out-of-band relaying is to exploit prevalent Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN) or Personal Area Network (PAN) interfaces for relaying purposes. For instance, the
first hop from the source to the relay can be performed over a short range link such as
WiFi, Bluetooth, or WiMedia, while the second hop from the relay to the destination can be
performed over a cellular link such as Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS),
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), LTE, etc.
Notice that in Figure 2.4, communications take place in two stages. In the first stage
(illustrated by the solid arrows), the source node S broadcasts the message to the destination
node D and the relay node R, whereas in the second stage (illustrated by the dashed arrows),
the relay node retransmits the received information to the destination node D. The relay node
indeed establishes another path 〈S-R-D〉 in parallel to 〈S-D〉, providing spatial diversity.
Several relaying strategies have been introduced in the literature [66], such as Amplify-
and-Forward (AF), Decode-and-Forward (DF), and Compress-and-Forward (CF). In the first
strategy, the relay node R amplifies the received signal, without trying to detect it, and
forwards the amplified signal to the destination node D. Despite its simplicity, AF strategy
also amplifies the noise embedded in the received signal, which may deteriorate the SNR.
To overcome this drawback, in the second strategy (DF) [67], the relay node R first detects
the received signal then encodes and forwards it to the destination node D. Finally, in the
last strategy, the relay node detects the received signal, and retransmits a quantised or a
compressed version of the received message to the destination, exploiting the statistical de-
pendencies between the message received at the relay and that received at the destination.
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The performance of these strategies essentially depends on the quality of the source-relay
channel. When this channel has good quality, DF strategy shows better performance than
AF strategy; otherwise, AF strategy outperforms DF strategy. This is due to the fact that,
when the source-relay channel quality (in terms of the received SNR) is poor, the relay fails
to successfully detect the received signal. In this case, in spite of amplifying the noise, and
adding the noise of the amplifier, AF strategy demonstrates better performance than DF
strategy [68, 69].
At the destination node, signals from both the source and the relay paths are combined for
a reliable detection. Different combining strategies are used for this purpose. For example, in
the Selective Combining (SC) method, the received signal with higher SNR is chosen for detec-
tion, while the weaker signal is ignored. Alternatively, in Maximal Ratio Combining (MRC)
method, both signals are considered for detection; a weighted average of the signal is consid-
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Figure 2.5: Multihop Cellular Network (MCN) with fixed Relay Stations (RS)
ered where the weight of each signal is proportional to its SNR. However, in MRC strategy,
different phase shifts due to different path lengths of the direct and the relay links should be
compensated before combining, to prevent any destructive addition, which requires that the
phase responses of both the direct and the relay channels are available at the destination.
In a cooperative relaying setup, if there is no direct link between the source S and the
destination D or if the direct signal received at the destination node D is ignored, the coopera-
tive relaying is reduced to multihop communications. The most obvious benefit of cooperative
communications is to break a long hop from the source to the destination to shorter hops.
The path loss of a radio link is normally proportional to 1/rα where r is the distance between
the transmitter and the receiver and α is the path loss exponent, which is normally between 2
and 4. Therefore, breaking a long link to several short links can reduce the required transmit
power considerably, providing energy saving to the transmitter. Both cooperative relaying
and multihop communications can be extended to more than two hops by cascading multiples
of the three-node network shown in Figure 2.3. However, two-hop relaying has several desir-
able properties such as avoiding system complexity, reducing routing overhead and collisions,
and decreasing the latency [70].
Multihop communications can also be used in cellular networks to enhance the QoS, to
extend the coverage, or to improve the EE of the network. The integrated network is generally
referred to as an Multihop Cellular Network (MCN) or a Hybrid Ad-hoc Network (HANET).
There are two main approaches for realising MCN. In the first approach (Figure 2.5), fixed
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Relay Station (RS) are deployed by the operator in some strategic locations – the relay
stations are indeed small BSs without any cooling facility, justifying their viability in terms
of both Operational expenditures (OpEx) and Capital Expenditures (CapEx). In the second
approach, there is no pre-installed RSs; instead, UEs forward traffic on behalf of each other
(Figure 2.6).
2.9 Cooperation Enforcement Mechanisms
Cooperation enforcement mechanisms are referred to schemes that are used to stimulate
players to cooperate while mitigating the harmful threat of selfish players. These schemes
can be classified into two main categories: credit-based and reputation-based schemes [71].
The former, which are also known as virtual currency based schemes [72–78], are based on
remunerating cooperative nodes to ensure cooperation. Nodes get some credit as an incentive
upon serving the network and use this credit to receive service from other nodes in the
network. If a node runs out of credit, it will stop receiving service from other nodes. On
the other hand, reputation-based schemes [79–85] use nodes’ reputations to detect and isolate
selfish players. Every node evaluates and maintains reputations of other nodes based on direct
observation of their immediate neighbours or the exchange of reputation messages with other
nodes. Behaviour of a node in response to a relaying request is monitored by other nodes. A
cooperative behaviour from a node results in boosting its reputation, while a selfish behaviour
leads to loosing its reputation.
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Nuglets [72–77] and Sprite [78] use credit or ‘micro payments’ to compensate for the
service that a cooperative node offers. A node receives credit for forwarding the packets of
another node, and this credit is deducted from the sender (or the destination).
On the other hand, reputation-based schemes rely on neighbour monitoring to dynamically
assess the trustworthiness of neighbour nodes and isolating selfish ones. Several reputation-
based methods have been proposed to mitigate selfishness and stimulate cooperation in
MANET such as WATCHDOG AND PATHRATER [86], CORE [80], CONFIDANT [79],
OCEAN [81], SORI [82], SAFE [83] and DARWIN [84].
Finally, it is worth pointing out that there is a subtle difference between credit-based
schemes and coalitional game-theoretic approaches. In the former, a player normally receives
a flat credit regardless of her effort or position to the cooperation gain, while, in the later,
any player receives an amount of credit proportional to her influence or contribution to the
coalition payoff.
2.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the required background and definitions from game theory,
microeconomics, optimisation and cooperation enforcement mechanisms. Game theory is a
mathematical tool to analyse strategic interactions of rational players. As the intelligence
level of mobile UEs and household appliances increases constantly, we can expect that 5G
UEs and future smart home appliances will behave to a great extent like a rational player,
always aiming at maximising their own payoffs. Moreover, it is envisaged that 5G will per-
vasively connect everyone and everything, allowing UEs to negotiate – exchanging context
information and reasoning based on this information – to see if there is a mutual benefit
from cooperation or not. Furthermore, it will enable smart home appliances to communicate
with the utility company to enquire about the price of electricity to find the best operating
interval to perform their tasks. Therefore, we find game theory as a useful tool to anal-
yse strategic interactions of these smart devices, encourage UEs to cooperate and to predict
strategic outcomes (equilibrium strategy profile) of the interactions between a set of smart
home appliances and a utility company.
Chapter 3
Coalitional Games for Cooperation
in 5G Mobile Networks
5G UEs are likely to be smart multimode devices supporting connectivity to multiple
RANs on the move. As the density of these intelligent devices increases in typical urban
environments, it becomes increasingly possible and desirable to adopt cooperative relaying
strategies. In this chapter, we apply coalitional games to incentivise rational UEs to cooperate
while discouraging them from acting selfishly. We further analyse how different relaying pro-
tocols and cooperation strategies among UEs can bring energy savings to the overall network.
Particular strategies are to investigate how cellular working in synergy with short-range con-
nectivity can lead to significant energy savings. Due to the proximity of cooperating devices,
low energy consumption combined with high data rate can be achieved through short-range
relaying. We apply coalitional game theory to model strategic interactions between UEs,
allowing them to form coalitions and share their limited resources whenever profitable. We
define appropriate utility functions to assess the common payoff of the coalition, and de-
fine how to distribute this common payoff among players so that all of them are satisfied.
Furthermore, we address the threat of selfish players and describe how to tailor the exist-
ing credit-based schemes for our coalitional game approach to isolate selfish players from
cooperative groups.
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3.1 Introduction
Battery life has indeed been identified by a TNS1 report [87] as number one criteria
of the majority of consumers purchasing a mobile phone. Reaffirming this, concern with
using up battery is among the top reasons why consumers do not use advanced multimedia
services (e.g., game or video) on their mobile phones more frequently. On the other hand, the
evolution in battery technology is very slow comparing to the Moore’s law, the average annual
growth rate for the battery capacity is only 6% [88]. Thus, it is becoming a key concern that
with the evolution of wireless technology, there exists a growing energy gap between actual
battery capacity and the growing consumption in mobile handsets (Figure 3.1). Moreover, the
current pace of technology scaling, platform improvement, and circuit design are not sufficient
for bridging this gap [89]. Therefore, a clear need for energy saving strategies exists, where
UEs carefully adapt their transmitter behaviour according to the dynamics of the application’s
requirements and the propagation conditions of the wireless channels to boost their EE, which
is also important for avoiding active cooling in UEs. An issue that is of upmost concern due
to power amplifier loading, leading to higher heat dissipation in handsets.
The proliferation of wireless applications and networks is driving the need for multimode
UEs, which is also another factor churning up the power consumption in future emerging
devices. Today, any feature phone or smart phone is equipped with a number of short-
1TNS is a world leader in market research, global market information and business analysis.
http://www.tnsglobal.com/
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range and cellular radio interfaces. Multimode UEs allow mobile users to experience higher
data rates and ubiquitous connectivity. However, this comes at an expense of higher power
consumption, due to multiple active interfaces.
Therefore, the power consumption dilemma introduces the need to revisit the design of
the network to introduce new strategies for enhancing energy efficiency, and cooperation is a
promising approach that can take a step in this direction.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related work.
Section 3.3 describes our system model, and section 3.4 formulates our proposed coalitional
relay selection game, defining the characteristic function of the game and solving it for ‘core
solution.’ This section also introduces an energy credit function and elaborates on its applica-
tion to isolate selfish players from cooperative coalitions. Section 3.5 presents algorithms for
implementing our proposed relay selection game. Section 3.6 discusses the simulation results.
Finally, section 3.7 concludes this chapter.
3.2 Related Work
Cooperative communication is an effective strategy to improve the efficiency of wireless
networks [66]. As discussed in Section 2.8, in general, we have two forms of cooperation:
multihop communications and cooperative relaying. Multihop communications have been
advocated for cellular networks to improve coverage and/or QoS. The resulting network from
the integration of multihop communications with cellular networks is generally referred to as
MCN or HANET [77, 90, 91]. There has been considerable interest from both standardisation
bodies and academia in MCNs. Opportunity Driven Multiple Access (ODMA) [92] is a
multihop relaying protocol, proposed by 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) to be
applied to UMTS Time Division Duplex (TDD) to: (i) increase the high data rate coverage
in the network; (ii) increase the capacity of the network; and (iii) provide distributed network
architecture for spot coverage and traffic hotspots. As another example, in [93], the authors
integrated MANET and GSM and introduced Ad hoc GSM (A-GSM) platform, addressing
practical issues contributing to the evolutionary changes of GSM in order to enable relaying
of calls. Moreover, in [94], the authors overview several contributions to Working Group 4 of
the Wireless World Research Forum (WWRF) and among others, present several relay-based
deployment concepts such as multihop and cooperative relaying.
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On the other hand, cooperative relaying has widely been investigated to improve effi-
ciency of PHY layer, leveraging spatial diversity of the relay channels to combat the fading
impairment [67–69, 95–102]. The basic idea behind this stream of works can be traced back
to the groundbreaking work of Cover & El Gamal in [103] on the information theoretic char-
acterisation of the wireless relay channel. The work builds upon a three-node (including one
source node, one destination node and one relay node) channel model first introduced by
Van der Meulen [104] and examines its channel capacity for the case where the channel is
contaminated by an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN). Spatial diversity of a relay
channel can be exploited to improve the SE of the channels through distributed space-time
multiplexing techniques [105, 106]. The essential advantage of cooperative relaying lies in the
fact that UEs can share their antennas and form virtual MIMO channels to take advantage
of the provided spatial diversity. In contrast to the transmit or receive diversity, this form
of spatial diversity is generally referred to as ‘cooperative diversity’ [102]. Laneman et al.,
in [67], address different forms of cooperative relaying schemes such as AF, DF, ‘selection
relaying’ schemes that adapt according to channel quality and ‘incremental relaying’ schemes
that adapt based on limited feedback from destination node, examining their performance
in terms of outage probabilities. Unlike this work where the authors constrain relay nodes
to operate in half-duplex mode and employ TDMA scheme, Sendonaris et al. [96, 97] study
the cooperation of two mobile users when both of them have data to transmit and address
practical implementation issues within a CDMA system.
There are several previous research efforts on enhancing EE of multimode UEs. In [107],
the authors propose a technique where Bluetooth link is exploited to wake up WLAN inter-
face whenever there is a pending packet, avoiding unnecessary periodic wake-ups of WLAN
interface. CoolSpots [108] exploits Bluetooth links not only as a wake-up channel for WLAN
interfaces, but also as a data link when the application requires narrow bandwidth; WLAN
interface is powered up only when the data rate reaches a certain threshold, allowing this
relatively power hungry interface to spend more time in the sleep mode. A Cooperative Net-
working Protocol (CONET) is proposed in [109] where UEs form clusters and inside each
cluster, one of cluster members is elected as the cluster head. Cluster members send their
traffic to the cluster head over Bluetooth links. The cluster head then aggregates all incoming
traffic from cluster members and relays the aggregate traffic to the Access Point (AP), over
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a WiFi link, which incurs some additional energy cost for the cluster head. To avoid the
battery of the cluster head being drained all the time, the authors suggest that the role of
cluster head be regularly circulated among all cluster members.
Cognitive and cooperative communications have recently been exploited to enhance EE
of multimode UEs. A cognitive radio is conventionally defined as an intelligent radio that
can adapt its transmitter behaviour according to the changes in the environment in which
it operates to improve its efficiency in terms of resource utilisation. Traditionally, cognitive
radio is used for efficient spectrum utilisation. However, recently, it has been advocated that
it can also be programmed to effectively utilise other scarce resources such as the limited
battery energy [110], which is a growing concern for mobile users. Lying in this stream of
research, C2POWER [111] and Green-T [112] were two European research projects aiming at
exploiting short-range interfaces to reduce power consumptions of multimode UEs. In [113],
the authors provide quantitative analysis to study energy saving performance for different
combinations of short-range and cellular technologies, namely WiMedia-WiFi, WiFi-WiMAX,
and WiFi-WiFi.
In our work, we go beyond the previous works by reinterpreting the notion of cooperation
as a strategic action where mobile users are players that can have potential conflicts of in-
terest which can be solved by the application of game theory. We consider UEs partitioning
themselves as coalitions. In each coalition, there can be multiple relay or multiple source
UEs pooling their resources (e.g. their batteries, antennas, etc.) and communicating cooper-
atively. We do not intend to concentrate on performance evaluation of different cooperation
techniques; instead, we aim at considering the cooperation as a strategic action and describe
how potential conflicts of interest among cooperating players can be settled, using an approach
based on coalitional game theory. Without loss of generality and for the purpose of exposi-
tion, we consider multihop cooperation; however, our game-theoretic approach is generic and
can be applied to other cooperation techniques as well. We define the characteristic function
of the game along with an appropriate utility function for assessing the profitability of the
cooperation within a coalition. The technique indeed seeks to maximise the social welfare
(i.e., aggregate energy saving of the UEs), while enabling their required QoS.
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3.3 System Model
Figure 3.2 illustrates our addressed scenario, where a RAN, which can represent a UMTS,
LTE, WiFi, or WiMAX network, is serving multiple mobile UEs. Every UE holds two ra-
dio interfaces: one short-range (e.g., WiMedia, Bluetooth, etc.) and one cellular (e.g., LTE,
WiMAX, WiFi, etc.). We assume that all UEs lie in the RAN’s coverage, albeit with different
channel qualities, and can send their traffic to the RAN either directly (i.e., over a conven-
tional cellular link, or cooperatively, over a cooperative short-range relaying link, which is
fundamentally a two-hop link from a source UE to the RAN. The first hop (from the source
to the relay) is performed over a short-range link, while the second hop (from the relay to the
RAN) is performed over a cellular link. In the scenario depicted by Figure 3.2, the shaded
region shows RAN’s coverage, that can be affected by path loss or shadowing phenomena. S1
is located in a deep shadowing area, and S2 while having good channel quality, suffers from
low battery level. Therefore, they start scanning their neighbourhood with their short-range
interface. As shown in the figure, S1 discovers R1, and S2 discovers R2 in their short-range
coverage. After initiating a short-range session with the relays, they start relaying their traffic
through them to the RAN. S3 has a good channel quality and battery level, so it sends its
traffic to the RAN over a direct link. Finally, R3 is left unemployed, although being available
as a candidate relay.
We assume that UEs can periodically sense their radio environment and can communi-
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cate with their neighbour UEs or RANs to exchange the acquired information; the frequency
of sensing and context exchange generally depends on how fast the wireless medium and
network topology change. Thanks to this context information, UEs become aware of their
radio environment (e.g., available networks, channel qualities, nearby UEs and their avail-
able resources) and can react accordingly, akin to a cognitive radio, to reduce their power
consumption. A UE may discover and join a nearby coalition, or some nearby UEs can ne-
gotiate and, when profitable, form a new coalition and adhere to a group strategy, to utilise
their limited resource (e.g., battery, spectrum, etc.) more effectively. We will only consider
upstream communications (from the UEs to the RAN); downstream communications can be
performed over conventional single-hop links.
In a coalition, energy efficient cooperation of UEs can take place in different ways, yet
energy saving performance of the coalition should outweigh the signalling and computational
costs to make the coalition. A UE always needs to evaluate EE of a cooperation opportunity
to choose an appropriate strategy, regarding whether to join a coalition or not or whether to
communicate directly or through a relay. We use the number of bits that can be transferred
spending one Joule of energy (Bits/Joule) as the EE metric of a link, which can be calculated
by dividing the link’s data rate by the required transmit power; i.e., ηEE = R/Pt [114].
We define coalitional relay selection game as a game in which UEs form coalitions and relay
each other to reduce their power consumption. There are three main challenges regarding this
game. The first problem is how UEs partition themselves into coalitions. That is, whether
it is better for UEs to form the grand coalition or they are better to partition themselves
in mutually exclusive sets, as illustrated by Figure 3.3. To answer this question, we need to
know whether the game is super-additive or not. If the game is superadditive, it is always
beneficial to merge smaller coalitions and make bigger ones. Therefore, the grand coalition is
trivial. However, if the game is non-superadditive, UEs need to find the best way to partition
themselves in order to maximise their social welfare. The second problem regarding the
coalitional relaying game is how to match relays and sources in a coalition so as to maximise
the coalition’s payoff-we define the payoff or the worth of a coalition as the maximum energy
saving that the coalition can achieve by the cooperation of its members. Finally, the third
problem regarding this game is how to incentivise relays to cooperate. As relays are normally
controlled by rational players, if there is no mechanism to prevent selfish behaviour, players
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Figure 3.3: Coalition Structure Generation (CSG): partitioning UEs into coalitions
will ask others to forward their packets but refuse to forward others’ packets to conserve their
limited energy for their own needs. Therefore, there should be a mechanism to encourage
cooperation while preventing any selfish behaviour.
As mentioned, in a non-superadditive environment, forming the grand coalition is not
profitable due to the communication or computation burden associated with forming bigger
coalitions. In this case, players first need to be partitioned in mutually exclusive coalitions (see
Figure 3.3) in a way that their social welfare is maximised. A typical solution to this problem
is to search for optimal coalition structure by performing an exhaustive search among all
possible coalition structures. Nonetheless, the number of possible coalition structures, which
is given by the Bell number, increases exponentially with the number of players. In fact, as
stated by Proposition 1 in [115], for n players, the number of coalition structures is O(nn) and
ω(nn/2), which means that the number of coalition structures is upper bounded by a constant
factor of nn and lower bounded by a constant factor of nn/2. Figure 3.4 illustrates the number
of possible coalition structures (i.e., the Bell number) as the number of players varies between
1 and 20 along with the associated upper and lower bounds. As apparent from the figure,
exhaustive search algorithm is not computationally tractable even for moderate number of
players, entailing efficient coalition structure generation algorithms. Further elaboration on
designing coalition structure generation algorithms is beyond the scope of this thesis. The
interested reader may refer to [115] for more discussion on the topic.
In the rest of this section, we introduce necessary parameters needed to formulate our
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Figure 3.4: Number of possible coalition structures for different coalition sizes with its upper
and lower bounds
proposed coalitional game model. Suppose that, as illustrated by Figure 3.5, we have the
grand coalition N , comprised of R relays denoted by set R = {R1, . . . ,RR} ⊆ N and S
source nodes denoted by set S = {S1, . . . ,SS} ⊆ N where R ∪ S = N . A relay obviously
consumes some energy for relaying a received packet. We denote the amount of energy that
relay r ∈ R consumes for relaying a single bit receiving from source s ∈ S, to the BS, by
erB; this includes the energy consumed for receiving, processing and forwarding the received
bit. We further denote the amount of energy that source s ∈ S needs to send a single bit
directly to the BS by e´sB and the amount that it needs to send one bit to the relay r ∈ R over
a short-range link by esr. These parameters are annotated on the graph model illustration
in Figure 3.5. We further denote the valuation of relay r ∈ R to its own contribution, to
the coalition, by cr (in terms of energy credit) and the valuation of source s ∈ S to the
cooperation of relay r ∈ R, to relay one bit for it, by hrs, ∀s ∈ S, r ∈ R. We interpret cr as
the amount of energy credit that relay r ∈ R expects for forwarding a single bit and hrs as
the amount of energy credit that source s ∈ S is willing to pay to the relay r ∈ R. In our
proposed model, we set cr = erB since relay r ∈ R consumes erB amount of energy totally in
favour of its partner source, and it will not be satisfied unless at least its consumed energy
is compensated. Generally, a source values a relay as the amount of energy saving that their
cooperation can yield; the more the amount of energy saving, the more the value of the relay
54 Chapter 3. Coalitional Games for Cooperation in 5G Mobile Networks
BS
R1 RR
S1 S2 SS
. . .
. . .
e1B eRB
e11
e21
eS1e1R
e2R
eSR
e´1B e´SB
e´2B
Figure 3.5: Graph model of coalitional relay selection game
for the source. Therefore, we denote the value of relay r ∈ R for source s ∈ S by hrs, which
we define as the difference between the energy costs of the direct link (i.e., e´sB) and the relay
link (i.e., esr); i.e.,
hrs = e´sB − esr. (3.1)
It is worth mentioning that hrs−cr yields the gross energy saving (i.e., excluding the signalling
cost) of the cooperation between relay r ∈ R and source s ∈ S. If hrs−cr > 0, then it may be
favourable for both partners (i.e., relay and source) to cooperate since any arbitrary division
of the achieved energy saving between them will make both of them better off. We do not
however assume that this inequality holds for all combinations of sources and relays, nor in
any combination at all. In fact, if this inequality fails for a pair of partner nodes, it implies
that for these nodes, direct communication is more energy efficient than the cooperative
communication. Therefore, they will avoid cooperation.
3.4 Coalitional Relay Selection Game
In this section, we formulate the problem as a coalitional game in characteristic function
form (Section 2.5). In the following, we first define the characteristic function of the game;
then, we derive its core solution (Section 2.5.1) and discuss how to update energy credits of
the players, using this solution.
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3.4.1 Characteristic Function
For an arbitrary coalition T ⊆ N , we define the characteristic function v(T ) as the max-
imum aggregate energy saving that the UEs lying inside T can achieve by their cooperation.
Recall that R = {1, . . . , R} ⊆ N denotes the set of relays and S = {1, . . . , S} ⊆ N denotes
the set of sources and that R and S are mutually exclusive since we assume that only idle
UEs can act as relays. Furthermore, R∪ S = N . To begin with, it is obvious that
v(T ) = 0 if |T | = 0 or 1. (3.2)
where the absolute value sign denotes the set’s cardinality2. This makes sense since when a
coalition is empty or consists of only one UE, there is no possibility for cooperation. Hence,
there is no energy saving for coalition, zero value for the characteristic function. More gener-
ally, we observe that any one-sided coalition (i.e., a coalition composed of only relays or only
sources) will again lead to no energy saving. Thus,
v(T ) = 0 if T ∩ R = ∅ or T ∩ S = ∅. (3.3)
In other words, only mixed coalitions of relays and sources can result in energy saving. The
best a mixed coalition can do is to split up into separate cooperating pairs (i.e., relays and
sources) and pool the achieved energy saving.
The simplest kind of a mixed coalition consists of two players, one of each type. To
determine the characteristic function for such a coalition, we define the utility as a weighted
function of the energy saving and the battery life extension that the UEs can achieve by
their cooperation. We define the energy saving and the battery life extension as follows. The
former is simply the amount of energy that is saved with the cooperation. The latter is the
amount of battery life time extension that the UE having the minimum battery level in the
coalition (i.e., either the source or the relay) attains after cooperation. Note that the utility is
always non-negative because the nodes will act individually if no profit (either energy saving
or battery life extension) is resulted from the cooperation.
Putting formally, the worth of a mixed coalition composed of relay r ∈ R and source s ∈ S
2Cardinality of a set is defined as the number of elements in the set.
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(i.e., when T = {r, s}) is given by
v({r, s}) = αγ¯rs + (1− α)λ¯rs ∀r ∈ R, s ∈ S, (3.4)
where α is the weighting factor, which is a fraction between 0 and 1. γ¯rs and λ¯rs are,
respectively, the normalised energy saving and the normalised battery life extension achieved
from cooperation of these two nodes. Here, normalisation simply means that [γ¯rs]R×S and
[λ¯rs]R×S are normalised matrices. That is,
Γ¯ =
Γ
|γrs|max (3.5a)
Λ¯ =
Λ
|λrs|max . (3.5b)
The energy saving of the cooperation is given by
γrs = max[0, hrs − cr] if r ∈ R and s ∈ S. (3.6)
This equation basically reflects the fact that if the direct link for source s ∈ S is more
energy efficient than the relay link (i.e, hrs − cr < 0), the source avoids the relay path and
communicates with the RAN directly, using its cellular interface. In this case, v(r, s) = 0.
Likewise, the battery life extension achieved by the cooperation is given by
λrs = max[0, Br,s − B´r,s], , (3.7)
where Br,s is the minimum of the (remaining) battery levels of the source s and the relay r
after performing the cooperation, while B´r,s is the same quantity without cooperation (i.e.,
if the communication were to be performed directly). Again, if cooperation leads to no
battery life extension, the second argument of the maximisation operation in Eq. (3.7) will
be negative. This leads to λrs = 0, which implies that it is efficient that the communication
be performed over the direct link.
Now, we introduce a new matrix U = [urs]R×S where urs = v(r, s) – we denote v({r, s})
as v(r, s) in a slight abuse of notation – is the potential utility (i.e., worth) that can be
obtained from cooperation of source s, s = 1, . . . , S, and relay r, r = 1, . . . , R. This matrix
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indeed summarises potential utility of all possible pairings of relays and sources, for the grand
coalition N . In order to compute v for a larger mixed coalition, we must optimally assign
available relays to the sources, maximising coalition’s worth, which is the aggregate utility of
the coalition. Mathematically this can be represented as
v(T ) = max [ur1s1 + · · ·+ urksk ] . (3.8)
The maximisation is taken over all arrangements of 2k distinct players r1,. . . ,rk in T ∩ R
and s1,. . . ,sk in T ∩ S, where k = min [|T ∩ R| , |T ∩ S|]. We refer to the evaluation of this
maximisation problem, which is in general an assignment problem [116], as relay selection
problem.
Recall that we assume that the game is superadditive, so players save more energy as
the coalition size increases, encouraging them to build the biggest coalition possible, i.e., the
grand coalition. Therefore, the game will result in only one coalition, the grand coalition.
Thus, we need to formulate relay selection problem only for the grand coalition.
3.4.2 Relay Selection Problem
We formulate relay selection problem for the grand coalition, N = R∪S, as a binary LP
problem (Section 2.6.1). To do so, let us consider RS binary decision variables as follows:
xrs =

1 if relay r ∈ R is assigned to source s ∈ S
0 otherwise
∀r = 1, . . . , R, s = 1, . . . , S. Any xrs indicates a yes/no decision in response to whether relay
r ∈ R should be assigned to source s ∈ S or not. That is, the relay selection problem is
essentially a binary decision making problem. We illustrate this in a graph model depicted
by Figure 3.6. In this graph, xrs = 1 means that relay r is connected to source s. Conversely,
xrs = 0 means that there is no edge between these two vertices. Relay selection problem can
now be written as a binary LP problem as follows.
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Figure 3.6: Relay selection problem as a binary decision making problem
maximise
x
∑
r∈R
∑
s∈S
ursxrs (3.9a)
subject to:
∑
s∈S
xrs ≤ 1, r = 1, . . . , R (3.9b)
∑
r∈R
xrs ≤ 1, s = 1, . . . , S (3.9c)
xrs ∈ {0, 1}, ∀r ∈ R, s ∈ S (3.9d)
In this optimisation problem, the first set of constraint inequalities, defined by Eq. (3.9b),
simply governs that any relay can be assigned to at most one source because we assume
that every relay can relay only one source at any time. In other words, any relay, in the
graph, is either connected to only one source or left unconnected. In contrast, the second
set of constraint inequalities, defined by Eq. (3.9c), reflects the two-hop constraint. That is,
any source can employ at most one relay – of course it may communicate directly without
employing any relay. The optimal value of this primal LP problem (i.e., p∗) gives the maximum
energy saving or equivalently the characteristic value of the grand coalition N , composed of
R relays and S sources (i.e., v(N )). That is,
p∗ = v(N ), (3.10)
The standard form of this LP problem can be written as follow:
maximise
x
uTx
subject to: Ax  b
x  0
(3.11)
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Figure 3.7: Structure of matrix A introduced in Eq. (3.11)
where A is a sparse matrix illustrated by Figure 3.7 and b is a column vector with length R+S
all elements of which are equal to 1. uT (where superscript T indicates matrix transpose) is
a row vector with length RS composed of the concatenation of rows of matrix U , defined in
the previous subsection. That is, uT = [uT1 , . . . , u
T
R], where u
T
r is the r
th row of the matrix U .
3.4.3 Core Solution
Relay selection game is essentially an assignment game, and its core solution is derived
by the following theorem [116].
Theorem 3.1. The core of coalitional relay selection game is precisely the set of solutions of
the dual LP problem of the corresponding primal relay selection problem.
Though this theorem has been originally proposed and proved by Shapley & Shubik, in
[116], we summarise their proof, putting it into the wireless communications context. The
dual of the primal LP problem defined by Eq. (3.11) can be written as follows.
minimise
y
bT y
subject to: AT y  uT
y  0
(3.12)
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This dual LP problem has R+S decision variables denoted by vector y ∈ RR+S as follows
y = [w1, . . . , wR, z1, . . . , zS ].
where wr denotes the payoff allocated to relay r, r = 1, . . . , R and zs denotes the payoff
allocated to source s, s = 1, . . . , S. Furthermore, this dual problem has RS constraints as
follows
wr + zs ≥ urs ∀r ∈ R and ∀s ∈ S. (3.13)
The objective function of this dual LP problem is simply the summation of the allocated
payoff to all players; i.e.,
bT y =
∑
r∈R
wr +
∑
s∈S
zs (3.14)
According to the duality theorem [63], the duality gap for LP problems is zero, so the
optimal value of the dual LP problem, d∗, meets the optimal value of the primal LP problem,
p∗. Hence, ∑
r∈R
wr +
∑
s∈S
zs = d
∗ = p∗ = v(N ). (3.15)
We interpret wr and zs as the amount of energy credits that relay r ∈ R and source s ∈ S
receive, respectively, as an incentive to cooperate. As mentioned above, p∗ is the energy
saving of the grand coalition N and vector y = [y1, . . . , yR, yR+1, . . . , yR+S ] is the distribution
of this energy saving among all players composing this coalition. Eq. (3.15) suggests that y
is an efficient payoff vector. Furthermore, Eq. (3.12) entails that y  0, which implies that
payoff vector y is individually rational since v(n) = 0 ∀n = 1, . . . ,N . That is, a player n ∈ N
can gain no payoff when she acts individually. Moreover, according to Eqs. (3.8) and (3.13)
∑
r∈T ∩R
wr +
∑
s∈T ∩S
zs ≥ v(T ), ∀T ⊆ N . (3.16)
which means that the payoff vector y is group rational, i.e., cannot be improved upon by any
subcoalition T ⊆ N . To recap, Eq. (3.15) indicates that an optimal solution of the dual LP
problem provides a payoff vector that is efficient. The individual rationality of this payoff
vector is immediate from the constrain y  0 of the dual LP problem in Eq. (3.12). Moreover,
Eq. (3.16) indicates that this efficient and individually rational payoff vector is also group
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Figure 3.8: An example of relay selection problem with three relays and four sources
rational; hence, we can conclude that it is located in the core.
Example: Let us consider a scenario with three relays and four sources as illustrated by
Figure 3.8. For this example, we consider WiFi (IEEE 802.11g) and WiMedia technologies for
long range and short range communications, respectively. The data rates annotated around
the nodes indicate their respective cellular (WiFi) data rates to RAN. The edges represent
short-range (WiMedia) links; solid ones depict available short-range links, whereas the dashed
ones imply that the two end nodes lie out of their short-range coverage. For example, there is
no short-range connection between S2 and R1, while S2 can communicate with R3 with data
rate 200 Mb/s.
For IEEE 802.11g, we assume that the transmission power is constant at 100 mW. Hence,
the SNR varies with the distance between the (transmitting) UE and the (receiving) AP and
with the physical characteristics of the environment, that demonstrates itself as multipath
fading. The SNR variations are exploited with the Adaptive Modulation and Coding (AMC)
scheme to encode bits into the transmission symbols. This results in an adaptive data rate
that varies between 1 Mbps and 54 Mbps. Table 3.1 summarises the data rate of IEEE 802.11g
for different distances between the transmitter and the receiver [117]. The last column of the
table shows the required energy to transmit one bit of information. The energy per bit is
calculated as the ratio between the transmission power, which is constant at 100mW, and the
data rate.
On the other hand, for WiMedia, which is a short-range technology operating in Ultra
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Table 3.1: Data rate and energy cost of IEEE 802.11g for different distances between the
transmitter and the receiver
Distance Date Rate Energy Cost
(m) (Mb/s) (nJ/Bit)
3 54 2
15 48 2
30 36 3
45 18 6
61 6 17
76 2 50
91 1 100
Wide Band (UWB) regime, the allocated frequency band is 7500 MHz unlicensed spectrum
in 3.1-10.6 GHz band. In order to avoid interfering with the licensed devices operating at
the same frequency band, the maximum amount of the radiation power spectral density for
the unlicensed communication in this band allowed by Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) is -41.3 dBm/MHz or equivalently 74.131 nW/MHz. Hence, for a UWB signal,
given that the transmitted signal is spread over the whole frequency band of 7500 MHz, the
maximum transmission power will be 560 µW. We assume that the transmission power of
the UWB system is constant at this maximum amount, and the rate varies with the SNR
variations from 53.3 Mbps up to 480 Mbps [118]. Again, the required energy to transmit one
bit of information can be calculated by dividing the transmit power by the data rate.
Table 3.2 summarises valuations of the relays and sources for relaying one bit of data.
The relays’ valuations are just the energy cost for them to send one single bit to the RAN,
which are summarised by Table 3.1. Note that these are the base (i.e., minimum) valuations,
so the relays expect payoffs that are at least as large as these base valuations. In contrast, as
mentioned before, the sources’ valuations are figured out differently; their valuations reflect
potential energy savings that relaying can bring for them as given by Eq. (3.1). Note that, in
this example, we ignore the reception and the processing energy costs for the relays. However,
later on, in Section 3.6, we will consider the reception costs for the relays.
Potential energy savings from all possible assignments of the relays to the sources for
transmitting a single bit of data (i.e., βrs) are summarised in Table 3.3, where the unique
solution of the relay selection problem (i.e., the optimal assignment of the relays) is illustrated
by the circled elements. As seen, the optimal solution is to assign relay 1 to source 4, relay
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Table 3.2: Valuations of relays and sources for one bit relaying
Relay Relay’s Valuation (nJ) Source’s Valuation (nJ)
i ci hi1 hi2 hi3 hi4
1 2 6 0 0 17
2 3 6 17 0 17
3 6 6 17 50 17
2 to source 2 and relay 3 to source 3. Moreover, the optimal solution assigns no relay to
source 1, so it has to communicate directly. The achieved energy saving from this optimal
assignment is the sum of the circled numbers, which is 71 nJ, for one bit. According to Table
3.1, the required energy to communicate non-cooperatively with the RAN is 89 nJ. Hence,
the achieved Energy Saving Gain (ESG) is 71/89 = 80%. The core solution, which provides
a fair distribution of this 71 nJ among the UEs, is obtained by solving the dual LP problem
defined by Eq. (3.12). We can inspect that the vector y = [7, 8, 27, 0, 5, 17, 7], which appears
as the vertical vector, w, and the horizontal vector, z, in Table 3.3, lies in the core.
Table 3.3: Coalition’s energy saving and the ‘core’ solution (in units of nJ)
Sources (S)
1 2 3 4 w :
1 3 0 0 14 7
Relays (R) 2 2 13 0 13 8
3 0 11 44 11 27
z : 0 5 17 7
3.4.4 Updating Energy Credits
The objective of the formulated relay selection problem is to maximise the aggregate
payoff of the players (i.e., the UEs). This common payoff is then distributed among the UEs
using the core solution of relay selection game. However, the utility – which is the amount of
energy saving – is non-transferable. Only the sources save energy, while the relays are incurred
some extra energy consumption. Consequently, even if the cooperation is socially desirable,
relays will be reluctant to cooperate unless they are stimulated by some incentive. Although
reciprocal altruism [66] can be adopted to enforce cooperation among UEs, where a relay helps
others with the condition of receiving help in the future, it is highly vulnerable to potential
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free riding attempts from selfish nodes. Therefore, to ensure the evolution of cooperation
among UEs, we need a scheme that encourages cooperative nodes while punishing the selfish
ones. For this purpose, we introduce an energy credit function for each node to make a
complete record of its cooperation in the network.
The energy credit function Cr(k) of relay node r ∈ R at time slot k is updated as follows:
Cr(k) = Cr(k − 1) + cr + wr. (3.17)
Recall from previous section that cr indicates the energy compensation received by relay
r ∈ R and wr indicates the amount of energy credit that is provided for this relay as an
incentive to stimulate it to cooperate. It is worth mentioning that since the battery of UEs
is limited, the credit that can be collected by a relay is upper bounded and cannot grow
to infinity. These energy compensation cr and the incentive wr should be provided by the
partner source. Assuming that this partner source is s ∈ S, the energy credit function for it
at time k is updated as follows.
Cs(k) = Cs(k − 1)− cr − wr (3.18)
Note that, in this equation, even after subtracting cr +wr amount of energy credit from this
source’s account and returning it back to the relay r’s credit account, the source will still be
left with some amount of energy saving, zs.
In a coalition, we can always check credit levels of the candidate sources and reject the
ones that does not have enough credit. To enable UEs to start cooperation at the very
beginning, one may provide an initial credit to each UE. Cooperative UEs will gain credit
over time and increase their credit levels, while selfish ones will loose their initial credits and
are consequently isolated from the coalition soon after.
3.5 Relay Selection Algorithms
We provide necessary algorithms to guide UEs and the RAN to play the proposed coali-
tional relay selection game. We start with the relay selection algorithm, which consists of two
parts. The first part is performed by the UEs, and the second part is performed by the RAN.
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Algorithm 3.1 Relay selection algorithm performed by a UE
START
OBTAIN the transmit power and data rate of the cellular link
FOR any UE in the coalition
OBTAIN the transmit power and data rate of the short-range link
ENDFOR
SEND obtained information to the RAN
IF do not need relaying service
IF do not receive any relaying command from the RAN
GO TO START
ELSE
RELAY the assigned source node
UNTIL receive a CSR END command from the RAN
GO TO START
ENDIF
ELSE
SEND CSR REQ to the RAN
GET ID of the assigned relay from the RAN
ESTABLISH a Cooperative Short-Range Relaying (CSR) session with the assigned relay
WHILE the CSR not finished AND receive no CSR END command from the RAN
IF have not received any command from RAN to change the relay
KEEP the current CSR session
ELSE
CLOSE the current CSR session
SEND CSR END to RAN
ESTABLISH a new CSR session with the new relay assigned by the RAN
ENDIF
ENDWHILE
SEND CSR END to the RAN
ENDIF
GO TO START
END
Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate these two parts, respectively. The first algorithm consists of
the procedures for a UE to collect context information such as data rates and the transmit
powers of the cellular and the short-range links to send them to the RAN. It also consists of
the procedures to assist the UEs to request, establish and end a CSR session. In contrast,
the second part consists of procedures for the RAN to collect those context information sent
by the UEs and to process and store them. It also consists of the procedures to receive and
process any request for a CSR session, optimally assign available relays to the sources, obtain
the core solution, and finally update the energy credits of the coalition members. Indeed,
this part of the algorithm is responsible for orchestrating the cooperation by commanding
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Algorithm 3.2 Relay selection algorithm performed by the RAN
START
IF receive any context information from a UE
STORE the context information and the ID of the UE
ENDIF
IF receive CSR END from any source
SEND CSR END to the relay
OBTAIN the core solution of the coalitional relay selection game, defined by Eq. (3.12)
UPDATE the energy credits of the cooperating UEs
ENDIF
IF receive CSR REQ from any source
SOLVE the relay selection problem, defined by Eq. (3.11)
DETERMINE the best source-relay matching
FOR any established matching to be dropped
SEND CSR END message to the source UE
ENDFOR
FOR any new relay-source matching
COMMAND the relay to cooperate with the source
COMMAND the source to establish a CSR session with the relay
COUNT the total number of bits relayed during the CSR session
ENDFOR
ENDIF
GO TO START
END
Algorithm 3.3 Algorithm for solving the relay selection problem
START
FOR any source node in the coalition
CALCULATE the cellular link cost for the source, e´sB
ENDFOR
FOR any relay in the coalition
CALCULATE the cellular link cost for the relay, erB
CALCULATE the cost of relaying for the relay, cr
FOR any source node in the coalition
CALCULATE the cost of short-range link between the source and the relay, ers
CALCULATE the value of the relay to the source, hrs = e´sB − esr
CALCULATE the worth of the coalition of relay and source, defined by Eq. (3.4)
ENDFOR
ENDFOR
DEFINE uT = [u11, . . . , u1S , u21, . . . , u2S , . . . , uR1, . . . , uRS ]
DEFINE x = [x11, . . . , x1S , x21, . . . , x2S , . . . , xR1, . . . , xRS ]
T
DEFINE matrix A as illustrated by Figure 3.7
DEFINE b = ones(R+ S, 1)
SOLVE primal LP problem defined by Eq. (3.11)
RETURN the answer, x
END
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Algorithm 3.4 Algorithm to obtain the core solution
START
GET the matrices U and vectors c and b from the primal LP problem
SOLVE dual LP problem defined by Eq. (3.12)
RETURN the solution y = [w1, . . . , wR, z1, . . . , zS ]
END
Algorithm 3.5 Energy credit updating algorithm
START
GET the core solution y = [y1, . . . , yR, yR+1, . . . , yR+S ]
GET the total relayed traffic during the CSR session
FOR any relay node in the coalition
GET the ID of the corresponding source node
CALCULATE the total consumed energy by the relay during the CSR session
ADD the calculated energy to the energy account of the relay
REMOVE the calculated energy from the energy account of the corresponding source
ADD the share of the relay from the saved energy to its energy account
ENDFOR
FOR any source node in the coalition
ADD the source’s share from the saved energy to its energy account
ENDFOR
END
all coalition members when and with which partner to establish a CSR session and when to
terminate it. Algorithm 3.2 involves three sub-routines for solving the relay selection prob-
lem, obtaining the core solution of the game, and updating the energy credit of the players.
Algorithms 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 present these sub-routines, respectively. Algorithm 3.3 begins
with calculating the cellular link costs for the relays (erB) and for the sources (e
′
sB). As
mentioned before, RAN calculates these costs by simply dividing the transmit power of the
links by their corresponding data rates, collected and stored by Algorithm 3.2. Note that in
a communication system, the transmit power is normally constant and the data rate changes
according to the channel variations.
3.6 Performance Evaluation
For numerical validation, we perform extensive simulations both in MATLAB and NS2
environments. In the former, we try to figure out the gross ESG of a coalition, while in
the latter we study the net ESG after deducting the signalling cost to form and maintain a
coalition.
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Table 3.4: System parameters for WiFi and WiMedia interfaces
Parameter WiFi WiMedia
Radiation Power 13 dBm -52 dBm/MHz
Transmitter Power Consumption (mW) 1749 426
Receiver Power Consumption (mW) 930 356
Frequency Band (GHz) 2.40-2.4897 3.168-3.693
Carrier Frequency (GHz) 2.445 3.432
Bandwidth (MHz) 20 500
Antenna Gain (dBi) 2.2 2.2
3.6.1 MATLAB Results
Setup
For MATLAB simulations, we consider the energy saving performance of a coalition illus-
trated by Figure 3.2 where UEs hold a WiFi (IEEE 802.11g) interface for cellular (infrastructure-
based) communications as well as a WiMedia interface for short-range communications. All
system parameters are summarised in Table 3.4. For the WiFi system, the radiation power
as well as the transmitter and the receiver power consumption values are according to the
data sheet of the Cisco Aironet 802.11 a/b/g wireless CardBus adapter [119], and the car-
rier frequency and the bandwidth values are according to IEEE 802.11g standard [120, 121].
For WiMedia, the carrier frequency and the bandwidth are according to ECMA-368 standard
[118], and the transmit and the receive powers are according to a sample WiMedia transceiver
design proposed in [122]. According to FCC, UWB communications are allowed in the fre-
quency band 3.1-10.6 GHz with maximum allowable radiation power spectral density of -41.3
dBm/MHz to avoid interfering with other licensed radios operating in the same frequency
band. According to ECMA-368 standard, which describes the specifications for the PHY
and the MAC layers of the UWB communication systems, the allocated spectrum for the
UWB communications (3.1-10.6 GHz) is divided into 14 bands each of which having 500 MHz
bandwidth. We assume that WiMedia system operates in the first band (3.1-3.7 GHz) and its
radiation power spectral density is -52 dBm/MHz, which complies with the maximum allowed
radiation power spectral density, regulated by FCC. Finally, assumed antenna gains for both
WiFi and WiMedia systems are 2.2 dBi, which corresponds to a dipole antenna.
We assume Non-Line-Of-Sight (NLOS) propagation model for WiFi channels and Line-
Of-Sight (LOS) propagation model for WiMedia channels. For the case of WiFi, we assume
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Table 3.5: Assumed channel propagation models for WiFi and WiMedia
System Channel Model
WiFi (IEEE 802.11g) [Pr(d)]dBm = −24.8− 50log10(d) + χ
WiMedia [Pr(d)]dBm = −63.8− 17log10(d)
path loss exponent of 5, lognormal shadowing, represented by χ = N (0, σ2), where σ=8dBm
[123]. For the case of WiMedia, we assume path loss exponent of 1.7 without any shadowing
or fading defects. Table 3.5 summarises these channel models. Finally, we consider Random
Way Point (RWP) [124, 125] mobility model with maximum speed of 3 m/s and pause time
of 5s to take into account the nomadic mobility in an indoor scenario such as a WiFi hotspot
in a coffee shop or a shopping mall for example.
In the simulations, we assume AMC scheme for both WiFi and WiMedia links. When the
receiver and transmitter are close to each other, the path loss is low, so higher order modula-
tions can be used, providing higher reliable data rates. On the other hand, when the receiver
and transmitter move away from each other, the path loss increases, deteriorating the channel
quality. In this case, the transmitter has to fall back to lower order modulations. In order to
take into account the AMC technique in the simulations, we add the receiver and transmitter
antenna gains to the transmit power (in decibels) and subtract the power loss of the channel.
As a result, we come up with the received signal strength at the receiver. We compare this
signal strength with the receiver sensitivity for different modulation schemes. Based on this
comparison, we determine the reliable data rate of the link. Table 3.6 summarises the receiver
sensitivities for both WiFi and WiMedia systems. For example, for the case of WiFi system,
when the received signal strength is greater than or equal to -80 dBm, it is possible to have a
reliable communication with data rate 18 Mbps. The minimum signal strength required for a
reliable WiFi communication is -90 dBm, which can support reliable communication with the
minimum data rate – 6 Mbps. If the signal strength drops further, an outage event will occur
and no reliable communication can take place. Figure 3.9 illustrates average reliable data
rates for both WiMedia and WiFi systems as the distance between the transmitter and the
receiver varies between 0 and 20m. As seen from this figure, the maximum ranges of WiMe-
dia and WiFi systems with the considered parameters and channel models are 10m and 20m,
respectively. It should be pointed out that since we consider two-hop uplink communications
where the first hop is performed over a WiMedia link and the second hop is performed over
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Table 3.6: Receiver sensitivities for WiFi and WiMedia systems
WiFi (802.11g) WiMedia
Rate Sensitivity Rate Sensitivity
(Mbps) (dBm) (Mbps) (dBm)
6 -90 53.3 -80.8
9 -84 80 -78.9
12 -82 106.7 -77.8
18 -80 160 -75.9
24 -77 200 -74.5
36 -73 320 -72.8
48 -72 400 -71.5
54 -72 480 -70.4
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Figure 3.9: WiFi and WiMedia data rates for different distances between the transmitter
and receiver
a WiFi link, the receiver of the WiFi link is an AP. Therefore, the receiver sensitivities for
the WiFi system in Table 3.6 are according to the Cisco Aironet 1200 Series AP [126].
To evaluate energy saving performance, we define ESG of a coalition as the ratio of the
total energy saving of the coalition to the required energy for UEs of the same coalition to act
individually (i.e., communicate directly with the AP). For example, when the total energy
saving of a coalition is 1J and the required energy for all member UEs to communicate without
cooperation is 2J, the ESG is 0.5 or 50%.
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Figure 3.10: Energy Saving Gain (ESG) for different coalition sizes and relay densities
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Figure 3.11: Standard deviation of ESG for different coalition sizes and relay densities
Results and Discussion
In order to evaluate the energy saving performance, we first conduct a simulation for
different coalition sizes and relay densities while the weighting factor of the utility function
(i.e., α) is constant at 0.5 – equal weights for the energy saving and the battery life. We vary
the coalition size from 10 to 100 UEs. For each coalition size, we repeat the simulation for
three different relay densities, namely 20%, 50%, and 80%. For example, when coalition size is
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50 and the relay density is 20%, 10 nodes act as relays, while the rest 40 nodes act as sources.
Every source node transmits with a constant rate of 10 packets per second with a packet size
of 1024B (bytes). Every 10s, the roles of source and relay nodes are switched around (all
relays become sources and vice versa) to give chance to every UE to act both as a source
and as a relay during the simulation time. This periodic role exchange continues during the
whole simulation time, which is 300s. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 illustrate average ESG and its
standard deviation, respectively. Obviously, when coalition size increases, ESG increases, too,
while its standard deviation shrinks. This is due to the fact that the more the number of UEs
in a coalition, the more the number of opportunities for cooperation. In other words, when
there are more UEs in a coalition, the chance of finding good relay-source partners increases,
which increases the ESG. The decrease in standard deviation is due to the fact that the
probability of finding a good partner relay increases as the coalition is populated with more
UEs. The standard deviation values in Figure 3.11 in fact show the precision and reliability
of the ESG values of Figure 3.10. A higher value of standard deviation shows that the ESG
cannot be reliable due to its high variation from one instance to another, depending on the
topology of the UEs and the wireless channel variations. Finally, as seen from Figure 3.11,
when relay density increases from 20% to 50%, ESG increases significantly, yet it increases
marginally when the density increases further from 50% to 80%, demonstrating a saturation
trend. When the coalition size is 100 and the relay density is 80%, we achieve the maximum
ESG (around 60%) with the minimum standard deviation (5%). These results can serve as
a guide to choose an appropriate coalition size for a target ESG while avoiding unnecessary
bigger coalition sizes to minimise the communication or computation burden.
To study the battery life extension of the UEs playing the game, we conduct another
simulation with a coalition size of 50 UEs and relay density of 50% (i.e., 25 sources and 25
relays) where all UEs have equal initial battery level of 2J. The simulation runs until the first
battery depletion occurs in the coalition. Figure 3.12 illustrates the battery life of the UE
whose battery runs out first among the coalition members. The figure contrasts the battery
life extension of this UE against a baseline scenario, where short-range WiMedia interfaces
of UEs are all switched off and all communications are performed over a cellular link. As
seen from this figure, cooperation is able to extend the battery life considerably. The figure
presents the battery life extension for two different values of the weighting factor, namely
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Figure 3.12: Impact of cooperative communications on battery life extension of UEs
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Figure 3.13: ESG for different values of utility function’s weighting factor, α
α = 0.5 and α = 1. According to Eq. (3.4), α = 1 only takes into account the maximisation
of the energy saving of the coalition, while α = 0.5 gives equal weights to the ESG and the
battery life of the UE having the minimum battery level in the coalition. As seen from the
figure, α = 1 extends the battery life 133%, comparing to the baseline scenario, while α = 0.5
provides 33% additional battery life extension comparing to the case of α = 1. That is, in
total, α = 0.5 provides 166% battery life extension comparing to the baseline case. Figure
3.13 illustrates the average ESG for different values of the weighting factor α along with
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its maximum and minimum values. As seen from this figure, the average ESG starts from
33.9% and increases gradually until 45.6%, demonstrating 11.7% variation for the whole range
variations of α (i.e., from 0 to 1), with standard deviation of around 10%. Several conclusions
can be drawn from this result. First, ESG displays low sensitivity to the variations of α.
Second, even the case of α = 0 (pure battery life extension strategy) results in significant
ESG (33.9%). Finally, as seen from the figure, the case of α = 0.5 leads to 43.6% ESG. The
overall conclusion that we can draw from Figures 3.12 and 3.13 is that choosing a moderate
value of 0.5 for the weighting factor leads to a negligible reduction in the ESG (only 2.1%),
while resulting in significant battery life extension (up to 33%), comparing to the case of
α = 1.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed credit scheme to detect and isolate
selfish players, we conduct a different simulation with a coalition size of 50 UEs and the relay
density of 50% (i.e., 25 out of 50 UEs act as sources and the rest 25 act as relays); among
them, 5 nodes are selfish, while the rest 45 are cooperative nodes. The simulation starts with
all UEs having equal initial battery of 2J and initial credit of 0.1. Similar to the previous
simulation, every source node sends 10 packets per second with packet size of 1024 bytes,
but different from the previous simulation, and every 10s, the sources and the relays change
their roles, giving chance to every UE to act as both a relay and a source equally likely.
The simulation lasts until all UEs run out of power. Figures 3.14 and 3.15 compare average
battery and credit levels of cooperative and selfish nodes, respectively. As seen from Figure
3.14, on average, battery of a cooperative node lasts about 40% more than the battery of a
selfish node. As shown by Figure 3.15, all UEs start with an equal initial credit (i.e., 0.1).
Cooperative nodes increase their credit level, while selfish nodes lose their initial credit soon
and are isolated from the coalition accordingly. As seen from Figure 3.14, the battery level
of the selfish and the cooperative nodes depletes with almost the same pace in the beginning
since selfish nodes still have credit in the beginning. However, soon after, selfish nodes are left
without credit. This is the time when other nodes avoid cooperating with them; consequently,
their battery starts to deplete faster than the cooperative ones.
Figure 3.16 illustrates ESG for three different numbers of relay nodes as the number of
source nodes increases from 1 to 30. This figure shows that, for a given number of source
nodes, ESG increases as the number of relays increases. Moreover, for a constant number
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Figure 3.14: Comparing battery lives of cooperative and selfish UEs
0 0.5 1 1.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Normalised Battery Life
C
re
d
it
L
ev
el
(J
ou
le
)
Cooperative
Selfish
Figure 3.15: Comparing credit levels of cooperative and selfish UEs
of relay nodes, as the population of source nodes increases, ESG increases in the beginning,
but it starts to saturate afterwards. In contrast, Figure 3.17 illustrates ESGs obtained by the
coalition for three different numbers of source nodes when the number of relay nodes increases
from 1 to 30. This figure demonstrates that the ESGs are similar for the cases with 10 and
15 source nodes, while the performance with 5 source nodes is slightly lower than the other
two cases. Comparing Figures 3.16 and 3.17 reveals that for a fixed number of source nodes,
ESGs increase as the number of relay nodes increases. Nevertheless, for a fixed number of
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Figure 3.16: ESG of a coalition for 5, 10 and 15 relay nodes when the number of source
nodes varies from 1 to 30
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Figure 3.17: ESG of a coalition for 5, 10 and 15 source nodes when the number of relay
nodes varies from 1 to 30
relay nodes, ESGs are saturated in the early stages and remain unchanged despite introducing
more relays.
In order to study the effect of mobility on ESG, we vary maximum speed of RWP mobility
model from 0 (i.e., static scenario) to 50 m/s (i.e., extremely dynamic). Throughout this
simulation, we keep α and the pause time constant at 0.5 and 5s, respectively. Figure 3.18
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Figure 3.18: ESG for different values of the ‘maximum speed’ of Random Way Point (RWP)
mobility model for the UEs (α = 0.5, pause time= 5s, R=25, S=25)
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Figure 3.19: ESG for different values of the ‘pause time’ of RWP mobility model for the
UEs (α = 0.5, maximum speed= 3 m/s)
shows the result of this simulation. As seen from this figure, ESG starts from 31.2% (for
the static case) and increases to 43.6% as the maximum speed reaches 3 m/s. Afterwards,
ESG gradually decreases as the maximum speed increases and settles at 34.3% for the case
of extreme mobility (i.e., when maximum speed of the nodes is 50 m/s). The standard
deviation of ESG is again around 9% for this simulation. This result shows that although the
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potential for energy saving is higher in a mobile scenario, comparing to a static scenario, the
ESG does not increase as the maximum speed exceeds 3m/s. Finally, Figure 3.19 shows the
result when α and the maximum speed are constant at 0.5 and 3 m/s, respectively and the
pause time varies from 5s to 500s. The ESG starts from 43.6% for the pause time of 5s and
demonstrates negligible sensitivity to the variation of pause time, settling at 37.7% for the
pause time of 500s. The standard deviation of ESG is around 9% for this simulation. The
overall conclusion that we can draw from Figures 3.18 and 3.19 is that the ESG is almost
insensitive to the variation of the pause time and the maximum speed, except for the speeds
up to 3 m/s.
All in all, our simulation results demonstrate that ESG depends not only on the total
number of UEs in a coalition, but also on the percentage of the relay nodes. When the coalition
size increases, both the communication overhead due to context exchange (for negotiation
between the UEs) and the computation time for solving the primal and the dual LP problems,
defined by Eqs. (3.11) and (3.12), respectively, increases. Therefore, to keep the running
time and the communication overhead of the cooperation at a practical level while ensuring
a reasonable ESG, a moderate coalition size of 30 to 50 nodes is recommended. Finally, as
an instance, for a coalition composing of 25 relay nodes and 25 source nodes, cooperative
communication can extend average battery life of UEs to more than double while successfully
detecting and isolating selfish nodes from the coalition.
3.6.2 NS-2 Results
Setup
The previous results (in MATLAB) showed the gross ESG, without considering the ne-
gotiation cost to form a coalition. To study the net ESG, we perform additional simulations
in NS2. Our setup for these simulations is quite different from the one for the previous
(MATLAB) simulations. Note that this is just an exemplary choice, and any combination of
technologies could be considered. We choose this combination for the sake of their available
patches in NS2. For instance, here, we consider the combination of WiFi (for short-range
communications) and WiMAX (for cellular communications) interfaces. Table 3.7 shows the
assumed power consumption values for each interface in each state; we consider three possible
states for each interface, namely Transmission (Tx), Reception (Rx), and Idle. We consider a
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Table 3.7: Power consumptions of short-range and cellular interfaces in different states
Interface
Power Consumption (mW)
Tx Rx Idle
Short
Range
890 890 256
Cellular 2409 1485 660
stationary environment (without any mobility), which is an adequate model for various cases
like users’ using their mobile devices at coffee shops, restaurants, airports, offices, etc. We
consider two rectangular cells with sizes 20 m×20 m and 60 m×60 m. The RAN is placed at
the centre of the cell and the nodes are deployed randomly in the simulation area. The num-
ber of nodes varies between 2 and 20 nodes. For the traffic model, we consider Constant Bit
Rate (CBR) traffic, with packet size 1024 B (bytes) and rate 3000 pps (packets per second),
where every node generates traffic. Two types of traffic are considered: Traffic 1 in which the
simulation time (100 s) is equally divided among the mobile nodes (as time slots); in these
time slots, participating nodes transmit one by one; i.e., only one node transmits at each time
slot. In contrast, in Traffic 2, node 1 transmits from slot 1 onwards; node 2 transmits from
slot 2 onwards; and so on. That is, at the last time slot, all nodes are transmitting. Every 5 s
a beacon is broadcast to update the nodes with the context information about the neighbour
nodes as well as the short-range and cellular data rates of them. The timeout period is 15
s; that is, nodes remove entries in their neighbour list in case no beacon has been received
within this period. Data rates of the short-range links vary between 6 Mbps and 54 Mbps,
while that of the cellular links fluctuates between 3.8 Mbps and 56 Mbps, depending on the
channel condition. Finally, in these simulations, we set the weighting factor (α) in the utility
function defined by Eq. (3.4) equal to zero, to figure out the maximum ESG that can be
achieved by a coalition.
Results and Discussion
Figures 3.20 to 3.24 show the net ESG obtained from our proposed coalitional game theory
solution for the node selection algorithm. The gains are due to employing correlative strategy
using a single intermediate relay. All the results represent average values over 10 replicas
with random seeds. As for the simulation scenario, nodes are randomly deployed. There is
only one BS in the centre of the cell and the UEs are deployed uniformly in a rectangular
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Figure 3.20: Net ESG for different coalition sizes (cell size=20 m×20 m, traffic rate=20
packet/s)
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Figure 3.21: Net ESG for different coalition sizes (cell size=60 m×60 m, traffic rate=60
packet/s)
cell area. Figures 3.20 and 3.21 illustrate the simulation results for simulation areas of 20
m×20 m and 60 m×60 m, respectively. Both of these results are for CBR traffic with a rate
of 20 packets per second with packet size 1024 B and 100 s traffic duration. Two types of
traffics are considered: Traffic 1 in which the simulation time (100 s) equally divided among
the mobile nodes (as time slots); in these time slots, participating nodes transmit one by one;
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Figure 3.22: Net ESG for different coalition sizes (traffic type 1 with rate 20 packet/s)
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Figure 3.23: Net ESG for different coalition sizes (Traffic type 2 with rate 20 packet/s)
only one node transmits at each time slot. On the other hand, in Traffic 2, node 1 transmits
from slot 1 onwards; node 2 transmits from slot 2 onwards and so on. That is, at the last
time slot, all nodes are transmitting. As seen from these results, there is an optimal density
of nodes for which the cooperation gain is maximum. For instance, in both of Figures 3.20
and 3.21, having 10 nodes results in maximum ESG. On the other hand, either having low
density of nodes or having very high density of nodes result in poor ESGs. This is because,
for the low density of nodes, the probability of finding a good relay is low, while for a dense
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Figure 3.24: Net ESG of relay selection algorithm for 1 to 4 class A relay nodes when the
coalition size varies from 5 to 30
area, the collisions from contending nodes to capture the medium essentially deteriorate the
cooperation gain. Another observation from Figures 3.20 and 3.21 is that for a lower number
of nodes, the ESG of Traffic 1 exceeds the gains of Traffic 2, while as the number of nodes
increases, the ESG obtained from Traffic 2 outperforms that of Traffic 1.
Figures 3.22 and 3.23 illustrate simulation results for Traffics 1 and 2, respectively. Com-
paring these results, reveals that despite different traffic types, the trend of energy saving
charts are almost similar. Figure 3.24 provides the net ESG as we increase the number of
nodes in a simulation area of 60 m×60 m from 5 nodes to 30 nodes; adding five nodes at each
step. We consider CBR traffic of type 1 and rate of 100 packets per second; the packet size
and the flow duration are unchanged (1024 B and 100 s). The figure presents the results for
varying number of Class A relay nodes that are defined as those UEs having good cellular
channel qualities able to provide WiMAX connectivity with data rate 54 Mb/s. This figure
demonstrates that: (i) ESG reaches its maximum when the coalition size is around 10 nodes;
and (ii) the net ESG is more or less constant at 17% for different number of relays. Table 3.8
summarises the average ESGs for different number of Class A relays. It reveals two interesting
observations. First, we obtain no additional gain by deploying more than one relay. Second,
for a network with a reasonable number of nodes and with at least one Class A relay, on
average, we obtain around 17% ESG.
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Table 3.8: Average ESG for different number of Class A relays, each experiment is averaged
over 10 replicas with random seeds.
Number of Relays Net ESG (%)
1 17.1
2 18.9
3 17.0
4 17.0
To sum up, our main results can be enumerated as follows: (i) to keep the computation
burden of the primal and the dual LP problems at a reasonable level, it is advisable to limit
the coalition size by 20 to 30 nodes; (ii) For any coalition, there is an optimum density of
nodes for which the ESG is maximum: having lower density of nodes leads to difficulty in
finding an appropriate relay node for cooperation, while a higher density of nodes increases
the interference level; (iii) as we introduce more nodes in the coalition, average ESG first
increases until it reaches a saturation point, afterwards it starts decreasing; and (iv) for the
considered traffic, there is no difference between obtained ESGs from having either a single
Class A relay or more than one Class A relays.
3.7 Conclusion
With the trend of increased data rates and the increase in number of energy-constrained
connected devices in the new era of IoT, more burdens are put on the design of the next
generation of wireless networking paradigm (the 5G). One of the main challenges facing
the new generation is the energy consumption of battery-operated mobile devices. With the
higher required data rates and the need to ubiquitous connectivity, energy efficiency has to
be addressed; otherwise, mobile users will be again chained to power outlets instead of wired
networking. Addressing such issue, we proposed a relay selection problem for cooperative
relaying scenario within the future heterogeneous networking paradigm. The proposed algo-
rithm forms a coalition of source mobile devices and relays, to enhance the energy efficiency
of the individual mobile devices, as well as the group combined energy consumption. The
proposed algorithm is built based on a game theoretical approach, namely the assignment
game. The proposed algorithm is split into two phases. First phase associates relays with
source mobile devices, in order to optimize the energy efficiency of the whole coalition of mo-
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bile devices. The final phase determines how to distribute the obtained payoff fairly among
players. We defined the characteristic function of the game and derived its core solution. We
also introduced the utility function and the key performance indicators for evaluating the
efficiency of relaying either for a pair of partners or for a coalition. Additionally, we advised a
reward scheme to compensate cooperative users; hence identifying selfish users and excluding
them from future cooperative coalitions. The results validate that the proposed technique
can extend the battery lives of the UEs by up to 166% (2.7 times). Moreover, the gross ESG
of a coalition can reach up to 50% in certain incidents. The results also show that excluding
the signalling cost, on average, the proposed game can introduce 17% net energy savings,
reaching up to 35%. The results also show the effect of the size of the coalition on the energy
savings, as well as the optimal coalition size to avoid inefficient context and signalling costs,
while keeping the running time of the relay selection algorithm at a feasible level.
Chapter 4
Extensive Form Games for Demand
Response in Smart Grids
Smart grid is another envisaged scenario for 5G as a promising use case for M2M applica-
tion. It essentially aims at transforming today’s power grid to an intelligent grid by connecting
all stakeholders from generators to utility companies and smart meters, allowing the grid to
operate more efficiently and reliably. This particularly allows the utilities to implement real-
time or close to real-time demand response programmes to solicit households to pursue a flat
consumption pattern. In this chapter, we capture real-time strategic interactions between a
utility company and the end-users as an extensive form game. We study DAP and quadratic
pricing tariffs, and discuss the best strategic response of users to each of these strategies to
achieve the NE. The game serves as a distributed optimisation tool to minimise load variation
in the grid. That is, even if the users selfishly minimise their electricity expenses, they will
automatically end up minimising the PAR of the aggregate demand, too. We study both DAP
and Real-Time Pricing (RTP) tariffs, and incorporate both MILP and Quadratic Program-
ming (QP) for scheduling smart home appliances to minimise the households’ electricity costs
subject to meeting their consumption preferences. The results show that the QP approach
can reduce the PAR of demand significantly, whilst reducing the end user’s electricity bill by
up to 50%.
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4.1 Introduction
Economists have long advocated that exposing consumers to the real-time price fluctu-
ations in the wholesale electricity market can considerably enhance the market’s economic
efficiency [127]. To this end, RTP programmes advertise real-time prices to the end-users and
monitor their instantaneous consumption. This entails the expansion of the legacy control
and communications infrastructures, supporting mostly the generation and transmission sys-
tems (e.g., Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)), all the way down to the
distribution networks and consumers’ premises in order to connect the whole supply chain
of the industry. To this end, Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) [128] is being de-
ployed around the globe to bridge the gap between the utility companies and the end users,
establishing two-way communication links between the distribution companies and the con-
sumers’ facilities. This will permit the grid to efficiently match the supply and demand and
to accommodation promising technologies such as Distributed Energy Resource (DER)s (e.g.,
wind, solar, etc.), distributed micro-storage devices, electric transportation, and Demand
Response (DR) programmes [26, 129].
In particular, smart grid can be exploited for DR where a utility company can monitor
electricity demand online and can shape user’s consumption pattern through appropriate
incentive mechanisms. For example, it can do so by increasing the price during peak hours
when the grid is highly stressed while reducing it during off-peak hours when there is a supply
surplus (e.g., over night). On the other hand, users can monitor price in electricity market in
real-time and can accordingly optimise their consumption, shifting their non-urgent demand
(e.g., Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV) charging) to off-peak hours. Improving the
social welfare, this can benefit both the system operator and the households [127, 130–134].
It allows company: (i) to shut down inefficient and environmentally unfriendly power plants
being used only during peak hours, and (ii) to avoid overdesigned transmission systems that
need to operate in full capacity only few hours a day or even few hours a year. Further, it
allows users to minimise their electricity expenses without decreasing their consumptions, just
by wisely scheduling their shiftable appliances. Figure 4.1 illustrates an envisaged a smart
grid scenario, depicting two-way power and information flows between the suppliers and the
consumers, whereas Figure 4.2 depicts the supply chain of an electricity industry, highlighting
its supply and demand sides.
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Figure 4.1: Smart power grid: the solid and dashed lines represent power and information
flows, respectively
Game theory can be employed to analyse customer’s behaviour in response to any change
in the price of electricity in the market. In a non-cooperative game, every player adheres
to a strategy that maximises its own utility, without necessarily concerning about the social
welfare. A price-aware user may shift its unnecessary demand from peak hours, when the
price of electricity is high, to off-peak hours, when the price becomes lower. A residential
user has generally two types of appliances. The first type includes items such as lights and
refrigerator that are price inelastic; i.e., no matter how much is the price of electricity, these
appliances are needed to be on and cannot be interrupted. In contrast, the second type of
appliances includes items such as washing machine, dishwasher, and PHEV that are price
elastic; unless their task is finished before their associated deadlines, they can be shifted to
other hours of the day during which the price becomes more affordable.
Adopting an effective pricing strategy by the company and an effective appliance schedul-
ing strategy by a smart household are the main challenges for a successful DSM program.
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Figure 4.2: Electricity supply chain, shaded blocks depict the demand side
Inclining Block Tariff (IBT) has traditionally been practiced for many years to make electric-
ity affordable for low-income people while charging higher rates for users who consume more
to fulfil their non-basic needs such as air conditioning. Several other pricing strategies also
exist for DSM programmes, including Critical-Peak Pricing (CPP), Time-of-Use (ToU) tariff,
RTP, and DAP. For example, in DAP, the utility sets the price of energy for the next 24
hours and advertises it to the users. However, in RTP, the company does not determine the
price in advance, rather it sets the price instantaneously based on the instantaneous demand
level, and announces it with a very short notice; e.g., one hour or even few minutes in advance.
In our work, we aim at incentivising users to follow a flat consumption pattern during
different hours of the day through leveraging the price of electricity to indirectly coordinate
user’s consumption. We study both linear and non-linear pricing tariffs to minimise the PAR
and discuss optimal scheduling strategies for users to respond to each of these tariffs. Every
user uses an optimisation problem to schedule its shiftable appliances to minimise her daily
energy expense subject to meeting the power consumption needs of her appliances and her
preferences for the operating intervals of these appliances. We validate our approach through
simulations. The results show that adopting a quadratic pricing tariff by the utility and a
quadratic scheduling scheme by the users is an NE (Section 2.2) that can save up to 52% in
users’ electricity bills, while attaining peak shaving by up to 88%.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related work.
Section 4.3 describes our system model. Section 4.4 formulates DR as an extensive form
game, while Section 4.5 details the considered pricing tariffs. Section 4.6 characterises smart
home appliance scheduling as both MILP and QP problems. Section 4.7 depicts the simulation
setup and discusses the results. Finally, section 4.8 concludes this chapter.
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4.2 Related Work
Kirschen [135] provides a good tutorial on the potential benefits and barriers for a suc-
cessful demand-side management program in a liberal electricity market, highlighting the
economic characteristics of the demand (e.g., the demand-supply equilibrium and the price
elasticity of the demand), describing the necessary tools for consumers to be involved in DSM
(namely price prediction and consumption optimisation), and suggesting solutions to increase
the price elasticity of the demand to encourage large number of small residential users to
actively get involved in a DSM programme. The paper argues that increasing the short-run
price elasticity of demand for electrical energy would improve the operation of these markets.
It shows, however, that enhancing this elasticity is not an easy task. The tools that con-
sumers and retailers of electrical energy need to participate more actively and effectively in
electricity markets are discussed. Furthermore, it discusses the unusual economic characteris-
tics of the demand for electrical energy and issues that must be addressed if the demand side
is to participate actively in the market. It also outlines the tools and techniques that have
been or should be developed to help consumers take advantage of the opportunities offered
by competitive markets. A more active participation of the demand side would make elec-
tricity markets more efficient and more competitive. It would also promote a more optimal
allocation of the economic resources.
In [136], the authors propose an interesting DSM technique based on utility maximisation
where a user has storage battery and different types of appliances with different utilities,
and the utility company employs different flat and real-time tariffs to coordinate indirectly
the users’ consumption to improve the system’s performance in terms of load factor and
generation cost and to decrease users’ electricity payment.
In [137], the authors examine experiences on DR programs in the European Union (EU)
and in some Member States (e.g., the UK, Italy and Spain), where there is already high
penetration of Smart Meters for commercial and residential customer groups, describing ini-
tiatives, studies and policies and highlighting the factors that have facilitated or impeded
advances in DR in European electricity markets. Similarly, in [138], the authors summarise
the existing contributions of DR resources in the USA electricity markets.
In [139], the authors propose a DSM technique in smart grid based on a network congestion
game where the price of electricity is a dynamic function of the level of congestion (i.e., the
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aggregate demand at the current time). The interesting property of a congestion game is
that it is essentially a potential game. Hence, selfish optimisation of individual users leads
to the maximisation of the social welfare. Potential games are basically the ones admitting
a potential function with the property that an improvement of an individual player’s payoff
improves also the potential function.
In [140], the authors characterise the DR as two microeconomic market models to match
the power supply and shape the demand, deriving their equilibriums in both competitive and
oligopolistic markets and proposing distributed DR algorithms to achieve theses equilibriums.
Soliman & Leon-Garcia in [141] study DSM when users possess storage devices and formu-
late two game models when utility is excluded from or is included in the game. In the latter,
they use Stackelberg game to model interaction between the users and the company and con-
clude that total cost and the PAR decrease when storage is present. Moreover, allowing users
to sell electricity back to the grid (e.g., during peak-hours) can help them further decrease
their total cost. However, it may deteriorate PAR, especially when company is absent from
the game.
In [142], the authors address a DSM problem with multiple companies and multiple users,
modelling it as a Stackelberg game where companies are the game leader and users are the
game follower: the companies move first by setting the price, and the users react by optimally
adjusting the amount of energy they purchase from each company. The authors also propose
a common reserve power for the utilities to improve the grid’s reliability in the presence of
an attacker who aims at manipulating the price information to avoid the game settling at its
equilibrium.
In [143], the authors propose a non-cooperative game model for a DSM problem with
a mixture of the traditional passive users and the active users who own distributed energy
generation and/or storage devices. They assume a quadratic tariff imposed by the com-
pany to charge the users and model the problem as a non-cooperative game. They solve
the game to find its NE incorporating Variational Inequality (VI). They also provide a dis-
tributed algorithm based on Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) for the users to independently
minimise their day-ahead cumulative monetary expenses for buying/producing their energy
needs. They show that the participation of the active users in the DSM programme benefits
not only themselves, but also the passive users – although the active users benefit more than
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the passive users do. In [144], the authors extend their previous work in [143] proposing
a cooperative optimisation approach to minimise the aggregate expense of all active users.
They also provide an algorithm based on Distributed Dynamic Pricing Algorithm (DDPA)
to distributedly solve this cooperative optimisation problem. They demonstrate through sim-
ulation results that the non-cooperative game approach that they propose in [143] achieves
the same performance that this cooperative optimisation approach can achieve in several less
number of iterations.
Modelling DSM problem as an aggregate game, in [145], the authors incorporate a similar
VI approach proposed in [143] to analyse the existence and the uniqueness of the NE and
provide a distributed asynchronous gossip-based algorithm when there is no central unit to
coordinate the users or advertise the aggregate energy consumption.
The introduced billing scheme in [39] neglects the different consumption patterns of the
users and charge them solely based on their daily energy consumptions. This causes a fair-
ness problem. The authors in [146] address this problem and propose a billing scheme that
charge any user based on her not only daily energy consumption but also load flexibility and
contribution to the social cost saving in the grid.
In [30], Mohsenian-Rad & Leon-Garcia formulate DSM problem as an LP problem when
the real-time electricity price in the wholesale market is reflected to the retail customers using
a combinational tariff composed of RTP and IBR and provide a simple and efficient Finite
Impulse Response (FIR) filter for users to predict the price for the whole scheduling horizon
when this information is partially revealed by the utility for only the current hour and maybe
a few coming hours. They also introduce a trade-off in the objective function of the formulated
LP problem, to achieve a balanced solution between minimising the electricity expenditure
of the users and minimising their waiting times for the operation of their appliances.
In [39], Mohsenian-Rad et al. study a DSM problem where a single utility company serves
multiple residential users interacting not only with the utility company, as in [30], but also
with each other over a Local Area Network (LAN). Formulating the problem as a concave
n-person non-cooperative game, they analyse the existence and the uniqueness conditions for
the NE and provide an incentive-compatible iterative algorithm for the users to distributedly
minimise their total energy cost, which also leads to the minimum PAR of the total load in
the system. Turn-taking in a round robin fashion, which can be coordinated by the utility
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for example, at every iteration, the granted user partially solves the optimisation problem
an provide the others with its achieved solution. The authors also analyse the convergence
condition for this algorithm and show through simulation results that it converges quite fast,
after around two rounds of iterations for every user.
The authors in [147] propose a heuristic optimisation algorithm for DSM based on evo-
lutionary computation, where the algorithm admits a predesigned objective load curve and
aims to bring the final load curve as close to this objective curve as possible.
In [148], similar to [30], the authors address a smart power system where several users
subscribe to a single energy provider and interact with it to maximise the social welfare, i.e.,
the aggregate utility of all users minus the total cost imposed to the provider. They formulate
the problem as a convex optimisation problem (Section 2.6.2), modelling the utility functions
of the users and the cost function of the provider as a concave and a convex (parabolic)
function, respectively. They propose an optimal RTP that clears the market and provide a
distributed algorithm to iteratively achieve this optimal price where at each iteration, the
provider re-adjusts the price and the production capacity based on the variations in the
aggregate load, while each user reacts accordingly through individually re-adjusting her load
such that the marginal payoff 1 of the user is always equal to the real-time price set by the
provider.
In [41], the authors consider a similar problem formulation as in [148] and study the
marker equilibrium under two different conditions: (i) when the users are price taking, i.e.,
they accept the price as a fixed value without considering the potential impact of their actions
on the price, and (ii) when the users are price anticipating, i.e., they are aware that their
actions may impact the price. They propose a strategy-proof mechanism, based on Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, to reflect the price fluctuations in the wholesale market to
the retail customers. In particular, the payment charged to each user is determined as the
difference in the social welfare of the other users with and without the presence of this user.
The strategy proofness property of the mechanism ensures that the users cannot do better
than truthfully declaring their demands and their valuations for the energy.
In [149], Pedrasa et al. address the management of a smart home’s energy services, employ-
ing Particle Swarm Optimization (PSW) algorithm [150] to determine the operation schedules
1Marginal payoff of a user is defined as the first derivative of her payoff/welfare function.
4.2. Related Work 93
of a DER, e.g., Photovoltaic (PV) generation, energy storage in PHEVs, and controllable end-
user loads (e.g., space heater, water heater, pool pump, etc.), to maximise the net benefit
that the user derives from the energy services assigning a monetary benefit to each unit of
“energy equivalent” of these services. For example, the “energy equivalent” of the space heat-
ing service is the thermal energy of the indoor air. The monetary values reflect the users’
perception on the importance of their respective services. Then, the authors study the cost
reduction gains of different smart home scenarios (e.g., when the weather is sunny/cloudy, or
when the PHEV is (not) parked at home during day hours) under different tariff structures
(e.g., ToU with feed-in rates, ToU with no feed-in compensation, and ToU with feed-in rates
and peak demand charges), highlighting the scenarios where the coordination among DERs
brings more value to the users.
In [151], the authors consider a DSM problem with one utility company serving multiple
residential users under DAP tariff, where the price of electricity for the day is determined on
the previous day. Similar to [136], they consider a marginal cost pricing, with a parabolic
cost function similar to [30]. The appliances are of either uninterruptible or interruptible
type. In the former, once the device is turned ‘on’, it has to remain ‘on’ until it finishes
the task, whereas in the latter, the time intervals during which the device is ‘on’, need not
be necessarily continual. Furthermore, they assume that an appliance may have different
operation modes, with different power consumptions corresponding to each mode. Hence,
the power consumption of an appliance can be controlled in a discrete manner from 0 to its
maximum power rate. The authors model the mode and operating time mismatches of the
appliances as additional (discomfort) cost, that is added to the (actual) monetary cost. They
propose a greedy algorithm to find a suboptimal solution heuristically and in parallel. The
proposed algorithm requires the users to communicate their load profiles to only the utility
company, instead of broadcasting them to all other users, which provides a better privacy.
In [152], the authors address a DSM problem with a single retailer selling/buying electricity
to/from multiple users. Some of the users have renewable Distributed Generator (DG) and
can generate their daily electricity needs partly; the rest of the users are regular ones without
generation capability. A user with DG can sell her excess generation back to the grid with a
buyback price, which is normally lower than the retail price at the trade time. The authors
propose a distributed parallel load scheduling algorithm that is run simultaneously by all
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users, in contrast to the sequential algorithm [153] that is run by one user after another but
not by more than one user at any time. Hence, a parallel algorithm converges faster than
its sequential counterpart. The proposed parallel algorithm minimises the cost of individual
users, which is the sum of two terms. The first term reflects the monetary cost of consumed
energy to the user, while the second term reflects her comfort loss due to the difference between
her demand and her real consumption. To run the algorithm, every user requires only the
price information and need to transmit their load profiles to only the utility company, without
need to disclose it to other users, avoiding potential privacy issues. The authors divide the
user load into three parts, namely base load, flexible load and schedulable load. Base load
involves user’s basic needs such as refrigerating which is considered to be fixed throughout
the optimisation. Flexible load can be adjusted by the user, but the adjustment results in a
satisfaction cost, e.g., adjusting the Air Conditioner (AC) temperature. The authors employ
same satisfaction cost function they introduced in [40] and introduce an additional penalty
term in the objective function of the formulated optimisation problem to discourage users
from making big changes in consecutive iterations.
In [154], the authors develop an algorithm for Home Energy Management System (HEMS)
and study its DR performance to schedule a residential user’s high power-consumption appli-
ances, e.g., water heater, space cooler, cloth dryer, and Electric Vehicle (EV). The algorithm
receives as inputs: (i) the user’s preferences and priorities for the operation of each appli-
ance; (ii) the utility’s demand curtailment request in terms of the demand limit level (i.e.,
the maximum allowable power consumption level) at the current time and the time duration
that this DR event lasts. Based on these inputs, the algorithm schedules the appliances so as
neither any violation from the user’s comfort level nor any creation of high demand after the
DR event (due to the compensation of the shed load) occurs. The authors also investigate the
lowest possible demand limit level before any violation can occur when the user has different
combinations of appliances or when she has different consumption habits.
In [155], the authors address a prosumer based DSM problem, where a household may be
equipped with a grid tied rooftop PV system for local generation while relying on the grid
for its extra demand. They propose clustering appliances with similar ToU probabilities2 and
study hourly energy cost and energy consumption of a household under different pricing and
2A function representing the probability of an appliance’s being ‘on’ during different hours of a day
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Figure 4.3: Considered DR scenario
scheduling policies.
Game theory provides a plethora of techniques that can be applied to smart grid to enable
it operate more reliably and more efficiently [36]. For instance, as detailed in [36], it can be
applied to better integrate micro-grids with the main power grid, by playing a coalitional
energy exchange game among some nearby micro-grids, to encourage demand response using
smart pricing strategies, and to ensure more efficient and more reliable multihop communica-
tions of smart elements (e.g., smart meters, EVs, etc.) with the control centre at the utility’s
premises. Finally, in [40], the authors propose a game-theoretic approach for designing an
optimal ToU tariff.
In our work, we go beyond previous work by capturing strategic interactions between
a utility operator and a residential consumer as a two-stage extensive form game (Section
2.4). We interpret different real-time demand response programmes as available strategies
at retailer’s disposal, who is the game leader. Then, we attain best response strategy of the
consumer, as the game follower, to any of these DSM programmes that yields the NE. We
characterise these responses as appropriate mathematical optimisation problems when either
a DAP or a convex pricing tariff is adopted. These problems predominantly aim to schedule
smart home appliances of a residential costumer so as to minimise her electricity bill while
assuring her consumption preferences, without sacrificing her daily energy need.
4.3 System Model
We assume a DSM problem consisting of a utility company and multiple residential users,
illustrated by Figure 4.3.
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To formulate the problem, let N = {1, ..., N} denote the set of users. For each user
n ∈ N , let lhn denote the load at hour h ∈ H = {1, ...,H}, where H = 24 denotes the
scheduling horizon. The daily load for user n is denoted by ln = [l
1
n, ..., l
H
n ]. The aggregate
load of all users at hour h ∈ H can be calculated as follows.
Lh =
∑
n∈N
lhn (4.1)
The daily peak and average load levels are calculated as
Lpeak = max
h∈H
Lh (4.2)
and
Lavg =
1
H
∑
h∈H
Lh, (4.3)
respectively. The PAR is calculated as
PAR =
Lpeak
Lavg
=
H maxh∈H Lh∑
h∈H Lh
. (4.4)
For each user n ∈ N , let An denote the set of household appliances such as refrigerator,
washing machine, PHEV and so forth. For each appliance a ∈ An, we define an energy
consumption scheduling vector
xn,a = [x
1
n,a, ..., x
H
n,a] (4.5)
where scalar xhn,a denotes the corresponding one-hour energy consumption that is scheduled
for appliance a ∈ An of user n ∈ N at hour h ∈ H. The total load of user n ∈ N at hour
h ∈ H is obtained by
lhn =
∑
a∈An
xhn,a, h ∈ H. (4.6)
As illustrated by Figure 4.4, the scheduler embedded in a user’s HEMS controls only her
shiftable appliances without touching the non-shiftable ones. The task of user n’s scheduler
is to determine the optimal energy consumption scheduling vector xn,a for each appliance
a ∈ An.
Next, we identify the feasible set for energy consumption scheduling vector based on user’s
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Figure 4.4: Scheduler embedded in user’s Smart Meter
demand and preferences. For each user n ∈ N and each appliance a ∈ An, we denote the
predetermined total daily energy consumption as En,a. Note that the scheduler does not aim
at changing the amount of this daily energy consumption, rather it aims at finding optimal
operating time intervals for each appliance, e.g., in order to minimise the daily energy expense
or the PAR of the total demand. A user needs to determine the beginning (αn,a ∈ H) and the
end (βn,a ∈ H) of a time interval that appliance a ∈ A can be scheduled. Clearly, αn,a ≤ βn,a.
For example, he may select αn,a = 6:00 p.m. and βn,a = 8:00 a.m. (in the day after) for its
PHEV to have it ready before going to work. This imposes certain constraint on scheduling
vector xn,a. Furthermore, we denote that
βn,a∑
h=αn,a
xhn,a = En,a (4.7)
and
xhn,a = 0, ∀h ∈ H\Hn,a (4.8)
where Hn,a = {αn,a, ..., βn,a}. For each appliance, the time interval provided by the user
needs to be larger than or equal to the time interval needed to finish its task. The daily load
of the system is equal to the total energy consumed by all appliances over 24 hours. Hence,
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we always have the following relationship.
∑
h∈H
Lh =
∑
n∈N
∑
a∈An
En,a. (4.9)
In general, some appliances may not be shiftable and may have strict energy consumption
scheduling constraints. For example, a refrigerator may have to be on all the time. In that
case, αn,a = 1 and βn,a = 24. We define the minimum standby power level p
min
n,a and the
maximum power level pmaxn,a for each appliance a ∈ An of user n ∈ N . Therefore,
pmina,n ≤ xhn,a ≤ pmaxn,a , ∀h ∈ Hn,a. (4.10)
We introduce energy consumption scheduling vector, xn, of a user, n ∈ N , which is formed
by stacking up the energy consumption scheduling vectors xn,a for all appliances a ∈ An of
the same user. We can now define the feasible set for energy consumption scheduling vector
of user n ∈ N as follows.
Xn = {xn|
βn,a∑
h=αn,a
xhn,a = En,a, x
h
n,a = 0 ∀h ∈ H\Hn,a,
pminn,a ≤ xhn,a ≤ pmaxn,a ∀h ∈ Hn,a}.
(4.11)
An energy consumption scheduling vector calculated by user n’s smart meter is valid if and
only if xn ∈ Xn.
4.4 Demand Response Game
We define DR game as a two-stage game played by the utility company and the users.
The utility moves first by choosing a pricing strategy, and then the users react by optimally
scheduling their appliances. We formally define this game as follows.
• Players: Utility company and its registered users given by the set N ∪{0}, where player
0 denotes the utility company.
• Strategies: Company chooses a pricing strategy that minimises the PAR and a user,
n ∈ N , chooses an energy consumption scheduling vector xn that maximises her payoff.
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• Payoffs: Payoff of the company is the negative of the PAR. Payoff of a user n ∈ N is
the negative of her daily electricity cost, which is given by the following utility function.
Un(xn; x−n) = −
H∑
h=1
ch(
∑
m∈N
∑
a∈Am
xhm,a)x
h
n (4.12)
Here, x−n = [x1, ...,xn−1,xn+1, ...,xN ] denotes energy consumption scheduling vectors
of all users except user n ∈ N , and ch(·) denotes the cost of generating electricity during
hour h ∈ H which might be a function of the aggregate energy consumption of all users
(including user n) during the same hour.
NE of this game is a strategy profile that no player can benefit by unilaterally deviating
from it. That is, the energy consumption scheduling vector x∗n,∀n ∈ N is an NE if and only
if
Un(x∗n; x∗−n) ≥ Un(xn; x∗−n),∀n ∈ N . (4.13)
As long as the cost function ch(·) is a strictly convex and increasing function for each hour
h ∈ H, NE of DR game always exists and is unique (see Theorem 1 in [39]). This unique NE
maximises social welfare (see Theorem 2 in [39]), i.e., the aggregate payoff of the company
and the users.
4.5 Pricing Strategy
Figure 4.5 contrasts linear and quadratic price functions chosen by the utility company
to charge consumers. The linear function, ch(Lh) = 0.1Lh, charges users based on a fixed
rate regardless of their consumption level at a time slot. However, the quadratic function,
ch(Lh) = 0.1L
2
h, charges the consumers based on a tariff that depends on the aggregate
demand level at hour h ∈ H: i.e., L. The more a user consumes at a specific time slot, the
more is the price of energy for that user in that time slot. Furthermore, Table 4.1 summarises
a three-level DAP tariff. The price is higher during evening hours, while it is lower during
night hours, encouraging users to shift their loads to off-peak hours. Note that although the
price is different for different hours, DAP is a linear tariff since at any time slot the marginal
price is constant and independent from user’s consumption level.
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Figure 4.5: Linear and quadratic price functions
Table 4.1: Day-Ahead Pricing (DAP) tariff
Time Block Off-Peak Shoulder Peak Off-Peak
Hour 00:00-08:00 08:00-18:00 18:00-23:00 23:00-24:00
Price (Euro) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1
4.6 Smart Home Appliance Scheduling
4.6.1 Mixed-Integer Linear Programming
When company chooses DAP pricing strategy, NE of DR game is achieved when users
adopt MILP scheduling (Section 2.6.1). To formulate this scheduling problem, we define an
indicator vector yn which has same dimensions as xn and its element is equal to 1 when
xn 6= 0 and is equal to 0 otherwise. For a DAP strategy given by price vector f = [f1, ..., f24],
which indicates the price for the next 24 hours, NE of game is the solution of the following
MILP problem.
min
yn
fT (pn ◦ yn)
s.t. :
βn,a∑
h=αn,a
pn,ay
h
n,a = En,a
yhn,a = 0 ∀h ∈ H\Hn,a
yhn,a ∈ {0, 1} ∀h ∈ Hn,a.
(4.14)
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where pn ◦ yn is the element-wise (Hadamard) product of the vectors pn and yn; we have
introduced a new power consumption vector pn with the same size as xn to factor out the
power consumptions of the appliances from their binary (on/off) states. That is, pn◦yn = xn,
where pn,a denotes the power consumption of appliance a ∈ An of user n ∈ N .
4.6.2 Quadratic Programming
Suppose that the utility company chooses a quadratic pricing strategy as follows to a
consumer at hour h ∈ H
ch(Lh) = αL
2
h, (4.15)
where α ∈ R is a real constant and Lh is the aggregate load at hour h ∈ H, NE of DR game is
achieved when every user adopts following QP scheduling to minimise its own energy expense,
independent from other users.
min
xn∈Xn
h=24∑
h=1
(∑
a∈An
xhn,a
)2
(4.16)
Recall Xn is the feasible set for xn, defined by Eq. (4.11). Obviously, the objective function is
the sum of the squares of hourly energy consumption of all appliances of user n, including both
shiftable and non-shiftable ones. Note that although there is no freedom for scheduling non-
shiftable appliances, they are included in the optimisation problem since their consumption
affects the aggregate load level at hour h ∈ H, which in turn affects the price at this hour.
4.7 Performance Evaluation
Simulation Setup
For numerical validation, we consider a scenario where a utility company serves 10 resi-
dential users. Each user has a set of shiftable appliances and a set of non-shiftable appliances.
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 present, respectively, the list of assumed non-shiftable and shiftable
appliances along with their power consumption rates and the users’ preferences for those
appliances, including start and end times for non-shiftable and durations and deadlines for
shiftable appliances. Each table has two parts, separated by a thick horizontal line. The
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Table 4.2: Non-shiftable Appliances
Appliance Power (W) Start End
Light 200 18:00 24:00
Refrigerator 30 00:00 24:00
Stove 1200
12:00 13:00
18:00 19:00
TV 200 09:00 24:00
Kettle 2000
08:30 08:35
16:00 16:05
20:00 20:05
Table 4.3: Shiftable Appliances
Appliance Power (W) Start Deadline Duration (h)
PHEV 1100 18:00 08:00 9
Space Heater 1200 00:00 24:00 2
Ventilation 250 00:00 24:00 1
Washing Machine 200 09:00 20:00 2
Tumble Dryer 2100 11:00 22:00 2
upper part includes 3 basic appliances that every user has, while the lower part includes 2
more optional appliances that a user may have. For each user, we generate a random integer
between 0 and 2 to determine the number of optional non-shiftable appliances. Then, we gen-
erate another similar, but independent, random integer to determine the number of shiftable
appliances for the same user.
We use linprog and quadprog MATLAB functions to solve the MILP and the QP problems
formulated by Eqs. (4.14) and (4.16), respectively. During all simulations, we assume that the
minimum power consumption of an appliance, a ∈ A, of a user, n ∈ N , is zero; i.e., pminn,a = 0.
For MILP, an appliance is either on or off, without any power control mechanism. In contrast,
for QP, we assume that the power consumption of a shiftable appliance can be controlled
between 0 and its power consumption rate, pmaxn,a . For example, power consumption of PHEV
charging can be controlled between 0 and 1100 W. We conduct three different experiments. In
the first experiment, we do not utilise any scheduler and simply schedule shiftable appliances
at most convenient time for the users (i.e., at the start times listed in Table 4.3) and assume
that the utility company charges the users based on the DAP tariff defined by Table 4.1. In
the second experiment, we assume that the utility charges the users based on the same tariff
but the users employ MILP scheduler to run their shiftable appliances at the most appropriate
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Figure 4.6: Non-shiftable and shiftable loads before scheduling
time. Finally, in the last experiment, we assume that the utility charges the users based on
a quadratic tariff defined by Eq. (4.15) with α = 0.1, and the users activate QP scheduler to
control their shiftable appliances.
Results and Discussion
Figure 4.6 illustrates the hourly aggregate load resulted from the first experiment (i.e.,
without activating the scheduler). The figure shows both shiftable and non-shiftable loads.
As seen from the figure, there are two peaks in the load, one at noon hours (1:00 p.m.) and
the other at evening hours (7:00 p.m.) when the users turn their high-consumption cooking
appliances on. The latter is higher than the former due to additional consumption for turning
on the lights or plugging the PHEVs for charging. It is also worth mentioning that 70% of the
load is of shiftable nature, mainly due to our assumption that every user possesses a PHEVs
and that PAR = 4.5.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the hourly aggregate load resulted from the second experiment (i.e.,
after activating MILP scheduler). We observe that MILP avoids scheduling any shiftable load
at evening hours. This is because of the fact that the price is at its maximum during these
hours. We also observe that MILP schedules the shiftable load mainly at night hours (i.e.,
after 11:00 p.m.) when the price is at its minimum. Doing so, it reduces PAR from 4.5 to 2,
which is equivalent to a PAR shaving of 71%. PAR shaving is a performance factor that we
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Figure 4.7: Non-shiftable and shiftable loads after Mixed Integer Linear Programming
(MILP) scheduling
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Figure 4.8: Non-shiftable and shiftable loads after Quadratic Programming (QP) scheduling
define as follows.
PAR shaving =
PARb − PARa
PARb − 1 (4.17)
where PARa and PARb are PARs after and before activating the scheduler, respectively.
It is worth mentioning that at 1:00 p.m., although there is already a peak of non-shiftable
load, MILP still keeps scheduling shiftable load at this hour. This is due to the fact that the
objective of this scheduler is to minimise the user’s daily expense, which is calculated based
on a linear tariff (DAP), independent from its consumption level.
Finally, Figure 4.8 illustrates the hourly aggregate load resulted from the last experiment
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Figure 4.9: Daily bills of users before and after MILP scheduling
(i.e., after applying the QP scheduler). As expected, QP distributes the shiftable load across
different hours much more evenly than the MILP does. We observe that unlike MILP, QP
does not totally remove the shiftable load from the evening hours, rather it schedules it so as
to fill the valleys of the non-shiftable load and to make the total load as even as possible. For
the considered scenario, QP achieves a PAR of 1.7, equivalent to a PAR shaving of 80% (9%
improvement comparing to the MILP). We also observe that QP avoids scheduling shiftable
load at a time slot when there is already a peak of non-shiftable load (e.g., at 1:00 p.m.).
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the impact of the game from the users’ perspective. Figure
4.9 illustrates the daily bills of the users resulted from the second experiment (i.e., adopting
DAP tariff and MILP scheduling). Obviously, every user pays less when they activate their
schedulers. The variations in bills from one user to another are due to the fact that every user
possesses a different set of optional appliances. Figure 4.10 illustrates the daily bills of the
users resulted from the second experiment (i.e., adopting convex tariff and QP scheduling).
Note that the bills before activating the scheduler (w/o scheduling) in Figure 4.10 are different
from their counterparts in Figure 4.9. The ones in Figure 4.9 are calculated using the DAP
tariff, while the ones in Figure 4.10 are calculated using the quadratic tariff. Comparing
Figures 4.9 and 4.10, we further observe that: (i) for both MILP and QP schedulers, users
pay less when they activate the scheduler, which implies users have incentive to participate
in both of these DSM programmes; (ii) users save more in their bills when quadratic tariff is
used than they do when the DAP tariff is applied.
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Figure 4.10: Daily bills of users before and after QP scheduling
4.8 Conclusion
We addressed a game-theoretic based distributed optimisation method for DSM in smart
grids. The players of the game involve a utility company and its registered end-users. The
utility’s strategy set involves different DSM programmes that can be implemented, and its
payoff is the peak shaving that each strategy can attain. Moreover, the strategy set of the
users includes different optimisation tools that they can adopt to schedule their shiftable
appliances, and their payoff is the amount of expense reduction that they can obtain in their
electricity bills by adopting any of these scheduling algorithms. We specifically studied two
different strategies, namely MILP and QP, and numerically evaluated the payoff that each
one can provide to the players. The MILP strategy is the best response for the consumers
to adopt if a DAP tariff is pursued by the utility company; and likewise, the QP strategy is
optimal if the utility company adopts a quadratic (or any other convex) pricing tariff. In fact,
the results show that for a DAP-MILP combination, the PAR can be shaved by up to 71%
and the consumers can save by up to 32% in their electricity bills. However, if the company
adopts a quadratic pricing tariff, and the users were to respond by QP scheduling, the payoffs
of all players will rise, indicating a pareto-efficient strategic improvement. In particular, this
pareto-optimal strategy can achieve up to 80% PAR shaving for the grid operator and up to
50% saving in the users’ energy bills.
Chapter 5
Summary and Future Work
5G is expected to be deployed around 2020, providing pervasive connectivity with ‘fibre-
like’ experience for mobile users. Apart from the expected 10 Gbps peak data rate, the major
challenge for 5G is the massive number of connected machines and the 1000× growth in mobile
traffic. This ultra-broadband and green cellular system will be the driving engine for the future
connected society where everyone and everything will be connected at anytime and anywhere.
Being in research and prototype stage, standardisation is the next milestone to achieve 5G,
which will be followed by the development phase for two to three years. The last phase is
network deployment and marketing, which may take another couple of years, foreseeing a
potential commercial deployment by around 2020. Smart grid is a promising application for
these next generation mobile networks, under the umbrella of IoT that intends to provide
two-way MTCs between smart home appliances and utility companies, exploiting this smart
power grid infrastructure. A utility company can monitor aggregate instantaneous load and
set hourly price for the coming hour(s) and advertise this to the users. Moreover, users can
monitor price fluctuations in the market and incorporate an appropriate scheduling algorithm
– embedded in their HEMS – to promote saving in their electricity bills, by deferring their
shiftable appliances (e.g., PHEV charging) to off-peak hours without interrupting their non-
shiftable appliances (e.g., light, stove, etc.). Game theory is a fascinating tool to incentivise
rational players to cooperate or to distributedly optimise smart systems where the decision is
not taken centrally by one decision making entity, rather there are several independent decision
makers affecting the system. As the intelligence level of mobile UEs and home appliances is
constantly increasing, we expect that in the near future these devices and equipments will be
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smart enough to resemble rational agents seeking to maximise their own payoffs. In this thesis,
we applied game theory as an optimisation tool and incentive mechanism to effectively utilise
scarce resources in these 5G networks and applications. In particular, we focused on two
fundamental problems, namely encouraging cooperation in mobile networks and enhancing
demand response in smart grids.
In the first problem, covered in Chapter 3, we addressed cooperation strategies as a means
to encourage mobile UEs to extend their battery lives. In fact, this is a legitimate concern
for the future mobile networks as the energy required to keep wireless devices connected
to the network dissipates quickly, while the battery technology is not mature enough to
anticipate existing and future demands. In fact, without new approaches for energy saving,
future mobile users will relentlessly be searching for power outlets rather than the network
access, and becoming once again bound to a single location. To avoid this problem and
to help wireless devices become more environmentally friendly, we addressed strategies to
reduce power consumption of multimode UEs to help enable mobile users to experience a true
mobile Internet. We discussed context-aware power saving strategies, based on game theory.
These strategies allow the cognitive engine to make the right decision towards initiating
cooperation based on the foreseen trade off between cooperation cost and potential energy
saving. Simulation results validate that UEs can reduce their power consumption by up to 50%
by adopting this approach. We also emphasised methods to enforce cooperative behaviour
among mobile devices, isolating selfish players from cooperative coalitions to prevent any free
riding attempt.
In the second problem, covered in Chapter 4, we applied game theory to enhance demand
response to cope with supply (price) fluctuations and to encourage end-users to consume elec-
tricity more evenly throughout the day. We characterised smart home appliance scheduling
as a mathematical optimisation problem that intends to minimise daily electricity bills of con-
sumers subject to meeting all their consumption requirements and convenience preferences.
We leveraged on the price of electricity to allow utility companies to indirectly coordinate
users’ consumptions to minimise PAR of the aggregate demand in order to improve the util-
isation factor of the grid. We specifically incorporated extensive form game to capture the
time sequence of interactions between a utility company and its subscribed users for specific
DSM programmes. The utility is the game leader. It moves first by choosing the price of
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electricity for the next hour(s). In contrast, the users are the game followers. They react
by scheduling their consumptions so as to minimise their individual energy bills, without
compromising their daily consumptions. These interactions essentially enhance the demand
response and help the electricity market to better utilise the (capital-intensive) power grid
assets such as generating units, transmission systems, substations and distribution systems.
In the following, we sum up the main findings of our study and highlight some research
directions for future work.
5.1 Concluding Remarks
Game theory can be effectively applied to resolve the conflict of interest arsing from
the cooperation of UEs that belong to different independent users. It can help encourage
cooperation in centralised or distributed fashion. In heterogeneous networks, multimode UEs
allow mobile users to experience ubiquitous connectivity and better QoS. However, holding
multiple active interfaces increases the power burden of UEs considerably. One of the biggest
impediments of future mobile systems is the need to limit the energy consumption of UEs
so as to prolong their operational time. Towards this end, we proposed a new promising
approach based on coalitional game theory and cooperative communications. The approach
allows neighbouring UEs to form coalitions and pool their resources (transceivers, antennas,
battery energy, etc.) to reduce their overall consumption and extend their battery lives. Our
simulation results indicate that by adopting this approach, mobile phones can reduce their
power consumption by 50% under certain scenarios. However, this is reliant on energy features
that already exist in the standard being enabled, and context-aware architectures that are
implemented; yet many vendors until now have ignored these energy features in their products.
Recall that the 50% energy saving gain for UEs is the gross saving without considering
signalling cost or the overhead. Our experiments in NS2, for a scenario where UEs lie under
the coverage footprint of a WiMAX BS and use their WiFi interfaces for relaying, show
that the net energy saving is around 17%, reaching up to 35%, now taking into account the
signalling. This moderate gain is mainly associated with the high power consumption of the
WiFi interface; we expect that this gain can substantially increase provided that appropriate
low-power short-range technologies (e.g., WiMedia) are exploited for the relaying purposes.
Pricing strategy and game-theoretic optimisation techniques can be exploited to optimise
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the demand response in smart grids, where the end-users are connected to the utility company
through a two-way digital communications infrastructure. This complementary information
network can carry the pricing information or other control signals from the utility’s control
centre to the consumers’ premises, and the metering or demand biding information in the
reverse path from the smart metres to the control centre. Apart from other benefits such as
automatic and remote meter reading, this can allow a utility company to implement more
sophisticated real-time DSM programmes. For instance, it can set the price of electricity
for the next hour(s) and communicate this to the users. Receiving this information, users
can independently react by optimising their energy consumption, contributing to the global
optimisation of the system load. In fact, providing a scalable and distributive optimisation
solution is the main advantage of applying game-theoretic techniques to the demand manage-
ment issues. Particularly, we captured strategic interactions between a utility company and
its end-consumers as an extensive-form game, where the company moves first by adopting a
pricing tariff to encourage users to consume electricity more evenly during a day, whereas the
users react by adopting appropriate scheduling algorithms to determine the best operating
intervals for their shiftable appliances, minimising their electricity bills, while meeting their
daily energy need and their comfort levels. We simulated a scenario with a number of users
where each user had a set of shiftable and non-shiftable appliances. We studied two promising
pricing tariffs, namely DAP and quadratic pricing. We characterised the appliance scheduling
as an MILP problem when a DAP tariff is applied, and as a QP problem when a quadratic
pricing tariff is opted. We developed and tested these two approaches on a custom-made
system level simulator. A crucial problem with DAP is that when demand is highly elastic,
it may cause considerable rebound effect, shifting peak demand to off-peak hours, creating
new peaks. To solve this problem, utility companies can adopt a quadratic pricing tariff (e.g.,
p(L) = 0.1L2), or any other convex pricing function. This kind of demand-dependent tariff
can benefit all stakeholders by essentially aligning individual interests of the users (minimum
bill) with the utility’s interest (minimum PAR). Hence, even if the users act selfishly to min-
imise their bills, they will automatically minimise the PAR of demand, too. Simulation results
reveal that this quadratic pricing tariff complemented by the QP scheduling on the user side,
can help users save up to 50% in their electricity bills – without reducing their consumption
quantities – just by appropriately scheduling their shiftable appliances. Moreover, this can
5.2. Future Work 111
help the utility to decrease the PAR of the total system load by up to 70%.
5.2 Future Work
While the results of this thesis support significant efficiency improvements gained from
applying game theory to 5G networking and smart grids, they also provide a basis for several
interesting research directions for future work:
Machine Learning
Machine Learning techniques can be incorporated to enable smart home appliances or
smart UEs to learn from the context they operate and perceive how to interact and which
action to choose in any particular circumstance so as to maximise their individual or group
payoff.
Mechanism Design
Despite being attractive from the social welfare point of view, the players of a game
might still be reluctant to reveal their private information. Therefore, appropriate strategy-
proof or incentive-compatible mechanisms should be designed to encourage rational electricity
consumers to reveal their consumption information or to stimulate rational UEs to reveal their
available resources truthfully.
Cyber-Security Games
Tailoring game theory techniques to ensure security in wireless networks and smart grids is
another interesting research path. This can be approached treating the problem as a zero-sum
game played between Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) and an attacker,
as game players, who want to maximise their own payoffs. The payoff of the IDPS can be
interpreted as the level of security that it attains for the system, while the payoff of the
attacker being the negative of this value.
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Coalition Structure Generation
Designing fast and efficient Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) algorithms in a non-
superadditive context for optimal partitioning of UEs that maximises social welfare is another
important issue. For this purpose, algorithmic game theory techniques [156] can be applied
to bring computationally fast and efficient algorithms for distributed coalition formation and
relay selection in future mobile networks.
Cooperation and Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency performances of different cooperation techniques (e.g., antenna pooling,
cooperative transmit/receive diversity, etc.) need to be evaluated. This is of crucial impor-
tance, because UEs need to figure out the payoff of adopting a certain strategy to help them
decide whether they should opt for that strategy or not.
Context-Aware Coalition Formation
Designing network protocols for efficient exchange of context information among UEs and
RANs, and for forming and joining coalitions is another fundamental issue.
Distributed Generation and Micro-Storage
Current research on demand response games can be expanded considering distributed
micro storage devices for users [143], enabling them to store energy when there is an excess
of supply, and to consume it or even sell it back to the grid when there is a supply deficit.
The users may also harvest energy from renewable sources such as wind or solar energy, run
a micro Combined Heat and Power (CHP) unit, or even use their EVs as a mobile storage
unit for electricity to more actively participate in demand response programmes (i.e., Vehicle-
to-Grid (V2G)) [157–159]. In this regard, it is essential to capture the intermittent nature
of renewable sources [160] through appropriate mathematical models (e.g., stochastic game
model) and to develop charging/discharging strategies for distributed storage units or for
EVs, so as to assure the grid stability.
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M2M Communications for Smart Grid
Designing efficient M2M communication protocols for smart grid applications supporting
short and infrequent data packets generated by smart home appliances, smart meters, smart
thermostats, or smart home Energy Management System (EMS) deserves further investigation
is another important research direction.
Binary QP Algorithm
Finally, inventing efficient algorithms for solving binary QP scheduling [161, 162] that
switches the appliances either ‘on’ or ‘off’ without any power control deserves further inves-
tigation.
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